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and jobs, and a simple sorting mechanism that generates underemployment – educated
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1 Introduction
The US government spends 60 percent more on compensation of general government em-
ployees than on purchases of intermediate goods and services. While purchases of goods and
services operate through the output market, employment and wages operate through the
market of inputs – the labour market. The large wage bill reflects the fact that the US gov-
ernment hires 16 percent of all employed workers, but also that it hires disproportionately
more educated workers. The left panel of Figure 1 reports the US government employment
share for nine educational categories, from few years into primary education until tertiary
education. The US government hires fewer than 5 percent of workers without education
beyond the 9th grade. At the top, the government hires one third of all employed workers
with Masters or Professional degree or who hold a PhD.1
Our main objective is to understand why the government hires so many educated workers.
We consider three explanations. First, the type of services and the technology used to
produce them differ from the private sector, and might require more educated workers.
Second, a cost-minimizing government constrained to pay a compressed profile of wages (i.e.
due to union pressures or political economy reasons), shifts its ideal composition from the
(relative more expensive) less qualified workers to the (relative less expensive) more qualified
workers. The third explanation is underemployment - educated workers performing unskilled
jobs – that we find to be more prevalent in the public sector.2 Our main contribution is to
develop a model that encompasses these mechanisms in a general equilibrium context. By
studying what explains the skill mix in the public sector in general equilibrium, we can also
analyze the implication of policies for wage inequality in the private sector.
We first provide empirical foundations for our paper. We look at survey data to establish
the stylized fact of a public-sector education bias. We summarize education into two cat-
egories: college and no-college, and show that the education bias holds across gender, age,
states, level of government, as well as over time and for different countries. We then provide
empirical evidence underlying the three possible explanations. First, we show that industry
and occupation composition of the public sector is important, which supports the idea that
public sector needs more educated workers to provide services such as education and health.
However, we show that the education bias also holds within industries and in two thirds
of 3-digit occupations that are common across the two sectors, so composition alone can-
not explain it. Second, we document the wage compression across educational levels in the
public sector, with higher (lower) pay for low (high) educated workers vis-à-vis the private
1Although the US data refers to government employment, throughout the paper we prefer to use the
term public(-sector) employment that is slightly more encompassing.
2In OECD economies a large share of workers are employed in jobs that require qualifications lower
than the ones they have, as reported by McGowan and Andrews (2015, 2017). The term underemployment
has multiple interpretations in different literatures. It is defined in Wikipedia as "the underuse of a worker
because a job does not use the worker’s skills, is part-time, or leaves the worker idle." Our research focuses
on a purely empirical construct reflecting the first dimension. In the mismatch literature, it is sometimes
referred as over-qualification, over-education or over-skilling depending on the specific context.
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Figure 1: Public-Sector Employment Share and Wage Premia By Educational Levels, US
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Note: The graph on the left shows the fraction of public-sector employment out of total employment for
each educational level. Government workers (Federal, State and Local government), fraction of employment
of workers age 16 to 64 with a given level of education. The graph of the right shows the public-sector
wage premium, estimated by regressing the log of hourly wage on a public-sector dummy and controls (2-
digit occupations, age, gender, region, year and a part-time dummy), separately for workers with different
education levels. CPS data, average between 1996 and 2018.
sector, as illustrated in the right panel of Figure 1. Third, we define and report estimates
of underemployment across countries and across public and private sectors. A large share
of workers are employed in jobs that require qualifications lower than the ones they have, in
particular in the public sector. The empirical evidence on wage compression has been doc-
umented in previous studies.3 The originality of the paper lies in providing more detailed
evidence on the education bias over different dimensions, evidence on underemployment,
and relate them with evidence on the public-sector wage compression.
To understand how the three explanations (technology, wage compression and underem-
ployment) relate to public-sector education bias, we develop a two-sector general equilibrium
model with underemployment. The model has two key features. First, alongside a perfectly
competitive private sector, our economy features a cost minimizing government facing a
wage schedule that does not necessarily equate demand and supply of labour. Given a wage
schedule, the government decides how many jobs of different skill requirement it needs to
produce a given level of public services. In this sense, our model merges a neoclassical
Walrasian private sector with a public sector modeled in the spirit of disequilibrium theo-
ries à la Malinvaud (1977) and Barro and Grossman (1971). Second, our economy features
heterogeneity across individuals and jobs. Workers can be high- or low-educated while jobs
have different skill requirements. Jobs are described through a ladder type mechanism, so
that individuals endowed with higher education are able to perform also unskilled jobs, but
workers with low education cannot perform skilled jobs.
We assume a variation of the Roy model (Roy (1951) and Borjas (1987)) in which
workers attach different "non-pecuniary" value to jobs in different sectors and of different
3See Katz and Krueger (1991) for the United States, Postel-Vinay and Turon (2007) or Disney and
Gosling (1998) for the United Kingdom and Christofides and Michael (2013) or Castro et al. (2013) for
several European countries.
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skills. This preference structure generates a non-trivial sorting mechanism that serves two
purposes. First, we generate a labor market allocation with endogenous underemployment,
that depends on the wage differential between jobs of different skills. Second, it allows for
both positive and negative wage premium in the public sector for different workers. On
the one hand, when public wages are above the underlying market clearing wages, there
would be more workers interested in having a public-sector job than available jobs, with the
excess workers driven to the private sector. In this regime, public employment is demand
determined and jobs are rationed. On the other hand, if the public-sector wage premium is
negative, the government can only fill all of its jobs if there are enough workers with a strong
preference for the public sector. Further, if wages for a certain type of workers are below the
implicit market clearing wages, the government might be constrained in hiring and forced
to substitute to another type of workers to maintain the production of its services. In this
regime, public employment is determined by supply. It is also possible that, if both wages
decrease below a threshold, the public sector can no longer produce the minimum level of
services and breaks down. Our model incorporates the three possible explanations for why
public employment is biased towards educated workers: technological, the compression of
the wage schedule that shifts the ideal skill-mix in the government, and underemployment
which interacts with and amplifies the role of the wage schedule.
We calibrate a variation of the model to match key statistics of the US economy. The
model is parsimonious, and seven structural parameters are obtained by matching seven
moments, including public employment and the public-private wage differential by educa-
tion, and a conservative estimate of underemployment. According to the calibration, public
jobs are rationed (demand determined). We carry out two quantitative exercises. First, we
solve the model under the assumption that wages in the public sector equalize wages in the
private sector, which also eliminates excess underemployment in the public sector. We then
solve it with the additional assumption that technology is the same in the two sectors. We
find that, in the US economy, the excess hiring of educated workers in the public sector is
mainly accounted for by technology, with the wage differential and excess underemployment
in the public sector accounting for 15 percent of the education bias. In other words, if the
US government aligned its wage schedule with that of the private sector, it would provide
the same services, but employing fewer 350 thousand college workers and more 480 thousand
workers without college and paying a 4 percent lower wage bill.
In our second exercise, we calculate the elasticities of private wages with respect to public
wages. During the Euro Area crisis, many governments reduced public-sector wage disper-
sion by cutting high wages while protecting low-wage workers. We find that the government
wage policy is a crucial driver of private wage inequality, but in an counterintuitive fashion –
a more compressed wage schedule in the public sector raises inequality in the private sector.
More wage compression alters the skill-mix in the public sector from unskilled to skilled
jobs. The skill-mix in the private sector then shifts towards low-educated workers, so their
wages fall while wages of high-educated workers go up. A one percent increase in unskilled
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public wages raises skilled private wages by 0.07 percent and lowers unskilled private wages
by 0.06 percent. In European countries the elasticities are up to four times larger. While
decreasing wage inequality for workers in the public sector, well-intended policies aiming at
reducing wage inequality within the public sector can actually backfire by increasing wage
inequality for everyone else in the economy.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the recent literature on public employ-
ment and how this paper contributes to it. Section 3 documents the main stylized fact that
government employment is biased towards educated workers, and evidence supporting each
of the three possible explanations. Section 4 constructs the two-sector general equilibrium
model with under-employment. Section 5 presents analytical results. Section 6 presents
quantitative results. Section 7 concludes.
2 The renewed interest on public employment
Public employment is a particular interesting and complex subject because it lies in the
intersection of different literatures: labour economics, macroeconomics of fiscal policy, public
economics, political economy and personnel economics. While it attracted large academic
interest between the 1970s and the 1990s, well summarized in two Handbook of Labour
Economics’ chapters by Ehrenberg and Schwarz (1986) and Gregory and Borland (1999),
this interest diminished in the following decade.4 The literature on public employment is
now staging a renaissance, as reported in Garibaldi and Gomes (2021).
Sparked by the fiscal policy responses to the Great Recession and the Euro Area crisis,
a new wave of theoretical research uses search and matching models to study the effects
of public employment and wages on unemployment and other labour market outcomes.
Examples include Quadrini and Trigari (2007), Postel-Vinay and Turon (2007), Afonso
and Gomes (2014), Michaillat (2014), Gomes (2015, 2018), Bradley et al. (2017), Albrecht
et al. (2019), and more recently Geromichalos and Kospentaris (2020), Esteban-Pretel et al.
(2021), Navarro and Tejada (2021) and Boeing-Reicher and Caponi (2017). Our approach
to model the choice of workers in the public sector - based on a cost minimization - is similar
to Gomes (2018). His model has search and matching frictions and is solved quantitatively.
Our model has a simple structure summarized by few equations allowing the study of un-
deremployment across sectors and how it interacts and amplifies the role of the government
wage schedule.
While search and matching frictions naturally allow the presence of wage differentials
and are important to study particular aspects of public employment, such as the role of
4The main themes of the earlier literature were the role of unions, political and budgetary aspects on
the wage determination in the public sector, exemplified by Freeman (1986), Courant et al. (1979), Borjas
(1980) and Gyourko and Tracy (1989). More related to our theory were papers estimating the length of the
queues for Federal jobs, namely Blank (1985) or Krueger (1988), or papers estimating the wage elasticity
of demand of government employees, for instance Ehrenberg (1973). The 4th Volume of the Handbook of
Labour Economics of 2011 does not have a chapter dedicated to public employment.
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job security extensively analyzed in Gomes (2015), Chassamboulli and Gomes (2021) or
Fontaine et al. (2020), we think that some of its consequences can be more clearly understood
with a frictionless labour market. More precisely, the skill mix chosen by the government
is bound to affect the skill mix of the private sector, even in a full employment context.
The papers taking this approach that are most closely related to ours are Domeij and
Ljungqvist (2019) and Gomes and Kuehn (2017). Domeij and Ljungqvist (2019) build a
neoclassical model, in the spirit of Finn (1998), where the public sector hires an exogenous
number of skilled and unskilled workers, to compare the evolution of the skill premium in
US and Sweden. They point out that the expansion of the Swedish public sector, that hired
more low-skilled workers, can explain the divergence of the skill premium between the two
countries. Gomes and Kuehn (2017) study, in a model of occupational choice, the effects
of education-biased hiring in the public sector on the occupational choice of entrepreneurs
and on firm size. Relative to these two papers, we endogenise the choice of the type of
workers the public-sector hires, add underemployment, and allow for different wages across
sectors. Our model, without search and matching frictions, can be interpreted as providing
a long-run perspective.
Other papers with frictionless labour markets include de Córdoba et al. (2010), Cav-
alcanti and Santos (2020) or Baerlocher (2020). de Córdoba et al. (2010) and Cavalcanti
and Santos (2020) assume that public wages are always higher than the private, so gov-
ernment employment is demand determined and jobs are rationed. In de Córdoba et al.
(2010) public jobs are allocated randomly while in Cavalcanti and Santos (2020) they are
allocated based on ability. Baerlocher (2020), like Domeij and Ljungqvist (2019) and Gomes
and Kuehn (2017), assumes the wages in the two sectors equate. None of these papers al-
low for the possibility of wages to be lower in the public sector, which is at odds with the
fact that some workers do receive lower wages. The way we formalize the acceptance of
lower wages by some public-sector workers is novel and originates from the discussion by
Musgrave (1982). Musgrave (1982) argued that an argument for public employment arises,
when workers themselves prefer to be employed publicly, either because of better working
environment or a pure preference. If a sufficient large number of workers have strong pref-
erences for the public sector, hiring might still be satisfied, even with wages below those of
the private sector.
The public sector is very different from the private sector, and the usual economic mech-
anisms that drive the private sector adjustments do not map into the public sector. One
of the missing adjustment channels is wages. When governments set their wages (or wage
growth), there is a discretionary component that can create the widely documented wage
differentials vis-à-vis the private sector. Our assumption that public wages may not nec-
essarily equate demand and supply in the labour market is well grounded in the public
economics and political economy literature that has shown that governments use public
employment and wage policies for a multitude of objectives, beyond the production of gov-
ernment services. These include: attaining budgetary targets (Gyourko and Tracy, 1989);
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implementing a macroeconomic stabilization policy (Keynes, 1936); redistributing resources
(Alesina et al., 2000); or satisfying interest groups for electoral gains (Gelb et al., 1991).
While these papers try to provide a justification for particular policies, the modeling of the
labour market and general equilibrium effects tends to be too simplistic or nonexistent. Our
approach is complementary. From the perspective of the labour market, the source of wage
differentials is not particularly relevant, so we consider it to be determined outside the model
and concentrate on studying their general equilibrium implications.
In term of modeling choice, the assumption that public wages do not adjust to equate
supply and demand is related to the fixed-price equilibrium literature that followed from
Barro and Grossman (1971) and Malinvaud (1977). More recent papers in this literature
include Benassy (1993) or Michaillat and Saez (2015). We think that this is a natural
assumption when thinking about the public sector labour market, but not for the private
sector that we model as Walrasian. One different feature of our framework is that when
jobs are rationed in the public sector, workers can always go to the private sector so there
is never unemployment in the economy, a dimension that we abstract from entirely.
Finally, a more microeconomic literature on personnel economics of the government
analyses the role of financial incentives for recruitment and performance, as well as issues of
selection on unobserved characteristics. This literature is well summarized in Finan et al.
(2015). While we do not believe we can rationalize a Walrasian public-sector labour market
by accounting for selection on unobservable characteristics, we certainly share the view of
the literature that the public-sector wage has important implications for which workers with
a given education select into the public sector. Our model can be easily extended to include
heterogeneous ability in order to illustrate this point. More than the wage compression across
education, the issues of selection on unobservables speak more to another well-documented
fact that public-sector wages are also compressed within education groups. We show that,
if the government does not fully reward their efficiency units as in the private sector, the
high-ability educated workers are less likely to go to the public-sector, that has to hire more
low-ability workers to compensate, which reinforces the education bias.
3 One stylized fact, three possible explanations
Section 3.1 reports the evidence on the public-sector education bias across various dimensions
and countries, which is the main stylized fact we want to explain. Section 3.2 reports
empirical evidence on the three possible explanations. First, we show that industry and
occupation composition of the public sector is important but alone cannot account for the
education bias. Second, we document evidence on the wage compression across educational
levels in the public sector. Finally, we define and report estimates of underemployment
across countries and across public and private sectors. The originality of the paper lies in
documenting the larger underemployment in the public sector and in connecting the stylized
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fact to the three possible explanations.
The main dataset used is the CPS. This survey provides labor force status, as well
as information on demographics, sector, occupation, industry, weeks and hours per week
worked. For the calculation of the stocks we use the monthly files from 1996 to 2018. We
restrict the sample to individuals aged 16 to 64. When we estimate the public-sector wage
premium we use the CPS March Supplement that has information on total income and
income components. The distinction between public and private sector jobs is based on a
self-reported variable. Each respondent is asked to classify his/her employer. We define
public-sector employment as work for the Government (whether Federal, State or Local
government). This method is consistent with the statistics published by the BEA.
We also analyse data from the United Kingdom, France and Spain used in Fontaine
et al. (2020) and Chassamboulli et al. (2020). We choose these countries because their
public sectors ar sizable and encompass different industries and they employ distinct hiring
processes. Furthermore, these economies have different labor market institutions and edu-
cation policies. This guarantees that common findings across these four countries are likely
to be intrinsic characteristics of the public sector and are not driven by country specifici-
ties. Our analysis is based on microdata and in particular, for each country, we use the
representative labor force survey, from which official statistics are drawn: the French Labour
Force Survey (FLFS), the UK Labour Force Survey (UKLFS) and the Spanish Labour Force
Survey (SLFS). See Fontaine et al. (2020) for details on the definition of the public sector.
For the wage regressions, we use microdata from the 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014 Structure
of Earnings Survey.
Finally, evidence of underemployment comes from the OECD Survey of Adult Skills,
part of the Program for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC).
The data were collected between 2011 and 2015. In each country, the survey includes
socio-demographic information (gender, education), labor market status and assesses the
proficiency of adults aged between 16 and 65 in literacy, numeracy and problem solving.
3.1 Public-Sector Education Bias
Figure 1 reported the public employment share for nine educational categories, illustrat-
ing the tendency of the public sector to employ workers with higher degrees of education.
For simplicity, throughout the paper, we summarize education into two categories: college
and no-college. College includes workers with an Associate degree, Bachelors, Master and
Doctorate. We include workers that attended but not completed college in the no-college
category. Still, one should keep in mind the further heterogeneity within these groups.
Table 1 reports the accounting definition used in the paper. We normalize the size of the
employment pool by 1, and we let n and 1 − n denote respectively the share of employed
workers with and without a college degree. College workers are indicated with subscript 1
while no-college workers with subscript 2. Superscript g refers to the government/public
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Table 1: Basic Accounting With Two Sectors and Two Education Categories
Public sector Private sector Total
College lg1 l
p
1 n
No-college lg2 l
p
2 1− n
Total lg lp 1
Note: Government (g), private (p), college (1), no-college (2). Total employment is normalized to 1. Share
of college in total employment (n).
sector while superscript p refers to the private sector. We thus indicate with lg1 the stock of
college workers employed in the public sector (similarly for the other 3 categories).
Figure 2 shows the bias of the public sector towards workers with higher education in
the US, UK, France and Spain. The top-left panel shows the fraction of public employment
out of total employment for workers with and without a college degree (lg1/n and lg2/(1−n)).
The top-right panel shows the fraction of college graduates out of total public and private
employment (lg1/lg and lp1/lp). UK and France have larger public sectors (more than 22
percent of total employment), while Spain has similar levels as the US. In all the four
countries the public sector hires significantly more workers with at least a college degree.
Given the two-by-two matrix described in Table 1, we further summarize the education
bias in the public sector with one of two indicators. The first indicator is the ratio of public
employment shares rg, simply defined as the ratio of public employment share for college
workers over the public employment share for non-college workers. The second statistics is
the education intensity ratio eig, defined as the ratio of the share of college graduates out
of public sector workers over that of the private sector. Formally:
rg =
lg1
n
lg2
1−n
, eig =
lg1
lg
lp1
lp
.
These two statistics, shown at the bottom of Figure 2 are complementary. In the case of
perfect symmetry across sectors, both statistics would have a value of 1. The statistics are
above 1.4 for the four countries reported. It is lower in France and higher in Spain. The US
has a ratio of public employment shares of 2 and an education intensity ratio of 1.5. In the
remaining of this section, we focus on the ratio of public employment shares, but we report
in Appendix A all the figures with the education intensity ratio.
In Appendix A, focusing on US data, we show the different statistics across gender, age,
US states, and over time. The ratio of public employment share is constantly around 2
across gender and age. When we disaggregate by US states, the ratio of public employment
shares varies from 1.4 in Washington DC to 3 in Nevada. The ratio is also persistent over
time, even though it fell around the Great Recession, most likely because of large changes
in private-sector employment.
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Figure 2: Public-Sector Education Bias: Two Simple Indicators
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of total employment for college and not college graduates. The bottom-left graph shows the ratio of public
employment shares (rg). The top-right graph shows the education intensity by sector, the share of public-
private workers that have a college degree. The bottom-right graph shows the education intensity ratio (eig).
For the United States the data is take from CPS (1996-2018), for the United Kingdom from the UK Labour
Force Survey (2003-2018), for France for the French Labour Force Survey (2003-2018) and from Spain from
the Spanish Labour Force Survey (2005-2018). For details on the methodology for the European economies
see Fontaine et al. (2020).
3.2 Three possible explanations
3.2.1 Technology: Industry and occupation composition
To account for the education bias, a first candidate is to look at the types of services that
the government produces. One key empirical finding of this section is that the public-sector
education bias holds across industries in the US, France and the UK (Figure 3). The Spanish
LFS does not allow for a disaggregation of public employment by industry. On the one hand,
even when excluding the Health and Education industries, industries that naturally employs
a large share of graduates, the bias remains, although with lower ratio. The US ratio of
public employment shares is 1.8 instead of 2. On the other hand, even within the health and
education industries, the public sector hires a larger fraction of graduates than the private
sector, leading to a ratio larger than 1.
To dig further into the composition of public-sector jobs, we look at the occupational
10
Figure 3: Public-Sector Employment Share Across Industries and Occupations
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classification from 3-digit ISCO-08 in the US.5 We consider only occupations that are com-
mon to the two sectors, where the share of public employment in total employment is larger
than 5 and below 95 percent.6 We find that two-thirds of the occupations have ratio of
public-employment shares larger than 1. Overall, the distribution across industries and oc-
cupations appear important, and indeed will play a key role in the theory that we propose,
but it does not explain everything.
3.2.2 Public-Sector Wage Compression
The second possible explanation concerns the wage policy and the tendency to compress
wages across educational groups. Specifically, low-educated public-sector workers tends to
be paid more than their private-sector counterparts, while the public-sector wage premium
5CPS occupational code is based on 2010 Census 3-digit occupational classification. We use a cross-walk
in order to classify occupations based on 3-digit ISCO-08.
6In doing so, some top-paid occupations are dropped (such as Manufacturing, mining, construction, and
distribution managers; Architects, planners, surveyors and designers) as well as some low-paid jobs (such as
Domestic, hotel and office cleaners and helpers, Vehicle, window, laundry and other hand cleaning workers,
Waiters and bartenders).
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Table 2: Regression Of The Log Of Hourly Wages
Controlling for 2-digit occupation Not controlling for occupation
College No college College No college
Public-sector 0.010*** 0.077*** -0.0262*** 0.095***
(5.09) (40.79) (-14.8) (51.7)
Controls
Age and gender X X X X
Region and year X X X X
Part-time X X X X
Occupation X X
Observations 668,287 918,664 668,287 918,664
R-squared 0.294 0.247 0.155 0.167
Note: Estimation by regressing the log of hourly wage on a public-sector dummy and controls (age, gender,
region, year and a part-time dummy), separately for workers with and without college graduate. When
controlling for occupation we include 2-digit occupation dummies. CPS data between 1996 and 2018.
of high-educated workers is lower (and sometimes negative). The basic evidence of wage
compression comes from a simple Mincer regression on log hourly wages on a variety of
controls, including the public-sector dummy.7
Table 2 shows the estimations for our two categories: college and no-college workers.
Controlling for 2-digit occupations, the estimate of the public sector wage premium is of 1
percent for college graduate and 7.7 percent for workers with no college. We will use these
numbers in the quantitative section. If we do not control for occupation, the public-sector
wage premium even becomes negative for college workers. There is substantial variation
of pay depending on whether the employer is the Federal, State or Local government, but
there is wage compression in all three layers of government. The Federal government pays
a premium of 0.10 to college graduates and 0.20 to workers without college. State and
Local government offer a negative premium for college workers between -0.06 to -0.03 and a
positive premium of 0.008 to 0.018 for workers without college.
To highlight the heterogeneity of the public wage policies, even within a country, we look
at regional differences across US states, shown in Figure 4. The public-sector wage premium
for both college and no-college, as well as the difference between the two, varies across states
by close to 20 percentage points. While there is large cross sectional variation in policies,
the wage compression holds in 50 out of 51 US states. The state with highest compression
is Washington DC and the only one with a negative compression is Kentucky.
Finally, we show in Appendix A the evolution of the public-sector wage premia over
time, in the US, UK, France and Spain. The wage compression across educational group is
persistent over time in all countries. The public sector dummy in the Mincer regressions is
always larger for workers with low education. Remarkably, the policies on wages can vary
7Gregory and Borland (1999) describe different methods to estimate public-private wage differentials of
which the dummy variable approach is the most elemental. More advanced methods include accounting for
selection or decomposing the wage premium into the explained and unexplained components of the gap.
These more sophisticated approaches, if anything, reinforce the wage compression fact. See Christofides and
Michael (2013).
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Figure 4: Public-Sector Wage Compression Across US states
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substantially in a few years. Most striking is the case of France. Between 2006 and 2010
the estimated premium fell by 15 log points for both workers with and without college. In
Spain, we find that the public-sector premium of college graduates fell from 0.10 in 2006 to
0.03 in 2014, while it remained constant for workers without college.
Grounded on the public economics and political economy literature, we interpret the
existence of these differentials as having an explanation exogenous to the labour market.
Alternatively, there could be two interpretations of the wage compression within a Walrasian
framework. The first is that these wage premia correspond to compensating differentials,
similar to other intra-industry wage differentials. There are some facts opposing this inter-
pretation. One of the most important non-pecuniary characteristics of public-sector jobs is
its security. In the US, health care insurance is also important. Both these characteristics
should be valued more by workers with lower education as they face higher risk of being
unemployed or losing health care insurance, which would imply that the public-sector wage
premium should be increasing in education. The second interpretation regards unobserved
ability. The pattern could be generated if the government purposefully wanted to hire the
more able workers with primary education and the PhD’s of lower ability, the best janitor
and the worst judge. Besides dismissing the existence of other government objectives ex-
ternal to labour market developments that influence public-sector wages, both explanations
seem unlikely.
Furthermore, the wage compression suggests public employment is demand determined.
If it was supply determined, for lower-educated workers who have a larger premium in the
public sector we would observe higher levels of public employment, and for higher-educated
workers that have a lower or negative premium, we would observe lower levels of public
employment.
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3.2.3 Larger underemployment in the public-sector
We refer to underemployment u, as to the stock of workers with college employed in jobs
typically performed by no-college workers. This is a purely empirical construct.
There is widespread anecdotal evidence of underemployment in the public sector in
many countries. In 2017, the Bank of Italy opened 30 jobs whose duties included feeding
cash into machines, a rather unskill task. The 85,000 initial applicants were reduced to a
"shortlist" of 8,000, all of them college graduates that had to face further exams in different
subjects to get the post (Geromichalos and Kospentaris, 2020). We look at the prevalence
of underemployment in the public and private sectors across countries using survey data.
The CPS data provides some suggestive evidence that underemployment in the public
sector contributes to the education bias. The public wage premium for college graduates is
lower and negative when we do not control for occupation. This suggests that workers with
a college degree in the public sector are more likely to be in lower paid occupations. To
corroborate this suggestion, we correlate the ratio of public employment shares in 3-digit
occupations (shown in the 2nd panel of Figure 3) with the gross public-sector premium
for no-college in those occupations.8 Indeed, Figure 5 indicates a positive and statistically
significant relation between the level of public-sector pays for unskilled workers in a given
occupation and the education bias within that occupation.
We provide more evidence of underemployment across countries, as well as across public
and private sector. We need first some accounting. Similarly as above, n is the stock of
employed college workers, and 1− n is the stock of non college workers. Let j1 be the stock
of skilled related jobs, only filled by graduates, so that j1 = n − u. Further, j2 is the stock
of unskilled jobs that is filled by workers without college or underemployed college workers,
j2 = (1− n) + u. We define the underemployment rate, indicated with ũ, as the fraction of
unskilled jobs performed by college graduates. Formally:
ũ = u
j2
.
Similarly, we define the underemployment rate in private and public sector as
ũp = u
p
jp2
, ũg = u
g
jg2
.
We use PIACC data to calculate the underemployment rates. Supplementary details are
provided in Appendix A.1. There is no consensus in the empirical literature on the best way
to calculate underemployment. We use different procedures. Our main approach is related to
the methodology used by OECD. We identify well-matched individuals as those who neither
8We compute hourly wage as the respondent’s total pre-tax wage and salary income for the previous
calendar year divided by the product of the number of weeks worked last year times the usual hours worked
per week last year. We then consider the mean hourly wage in each occupation for the workers with
no-college.
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Figure 5: Ratio Of Public-Sector Employment Shares And No-College Public-Sector Premia
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in the occupation. CPS data between 1996 and 2018.
feel they have the skills to perform a more demanding job nor feel the need for further
training to be able to perform their current job satisfactorily. By occupation (isco 1), we
calculate the average and standard deviation of the number of years of completed education
for (self-reported) well-matched workers. The required educational attainment of a given
occupation is calculated as the mean of completed schooling of all well-matched workers
(with a symmetric band of 1.96 standard deviation). Workers are defined as underemployed
when their years of completed education are 1.96 standard deviation above the mean of
well-matched workers in their occupation.
More formally, for individual i in occupation j, with years of schooling eij, the dummy
"underemployed" uij equals:
uij =
1 if eij > e
wm
j + 1.96σewmj
0 otherwise
where ewmj (σewmj ) refers to the mean (standard deviation) years of completed education of
well-matched workers in occupation j.
The left graph in Figure 6 reports underemployment rate across countries. On average,
more than 10 percent of unskilled jobs are held by people that have years of education well
above those of well-matched people in that occupation. The minimum level is just below
5 percent in countries such as Austria and Ireland. The maximum is above 17 percent in
Italy. Our key empirical evidence is in the graph on the right. In 15 out of 21 countries
(more than 70% of our sample) the underemployment rate is larger in the public than in
the private sector. In the US, the underemployment rate is 10.2 percent in the public sector
and 8.7 percent in the private.
Our main measure of underemployment is extremely conservative, and is lower than
most estimates from the literature.9 We show in Appendix A.1 the underemployment rates
9Barnichon and Zylberberg (2019) report that 38% of US college graduates work in lower skill-
requirement occupations. Using meta-analysis, Leuven and Oosterbeek (2011) find that a third of American
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Figure 6: Underemployment Rate Across Countries
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Note: PIAAC (Survey of Adult Skills). By occupation, we calculate the mean and standard deviation of the
number of years of education of (self-reported) well-matched people. We consider as underemployed workers
whose years of education are 1.96 s.d. above the mean years of education of well-matched workers in an
occupation.
calculated with three other less conservative methods. First, we use the same approach
but change the cutoff. We classify as underemployed, workers whose years of completed
education are 1 s.d. above the mean years of education of well-matched workers in their
occupation (i.e. uij = 1 if eij > ewmj + σewmj ). The second approach considers as underem-
ployed college graduates that are not well-matched and work in 1-digit occupations that are
majority non-college. The third approach is similar to the second but focusses on 2-digit
occupations. These approaches give larger underemployment rates: 27 percent of unskilled
jobs are held by underemployed workers using the first alternative and around 18 percent
for the second and the third. Also, the higher prevalence of underemployment in the public
sector is reinformed. In each of the approaches: 95, 90 and 85 percent of the countries
display higher underemployment rate in the public sector.
4 Two-Sector Model With Underemployment
4.1 Technology and Preferences
Individuals are endowed with one unit of indivisible labor. There are two types of individuals
with high (1) and low (2) education. The supply of educated individuals in the economy is
indicated with n, while the supply of the low-educated workers is indicated with 1− n.
A representative firm and a government offer jobs requiring different skills. The super-
script x = p, g refers to the private or public sector and the subscript e = 1, 2 refers to both
the education of the worker and the skill of the job. The government has jg1 skilled jobs and
jg2 unskilled jobs, while the private sector has jp1 and jp2 . The representative firm produces a
private-sector output y - the numeraire of the economy - with a constant return technology.
workers are over-schooled which is consistent with estimates by Clark et al. (2017).
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In what follows we use a Cobb Douglas specification,
y = (jp1)α(jp2)1−α, (1)
where α is the skill intensity. The government produces government services g – a different
good from the private sector for which there is no market (price) – using,
g = (jg1)β(jg2)1−β. (2)
We allow for technology to be different from the private sector β 6= α reflecting the fact that
these governments services might require more or less skilled jobs.10
A key assumption concerns the ability of individuals to perform different jobs. Jobs can
be described through a ladder type mechanism, so that individuals with high education are
also able to perform unskilled jobs. They can perform at zero effort costs both type of jobs
while individuals with low education can only perform at no cost the unskilled job, while
we assume that the cost of effort required to perform the skilled job is (infinitely) large.
Individual preferences are linear and the model is static. Each individual worker i has
an heterogeneous “non-pecuniary value" over skilled and unskilled jobs in the private and
public sector εx,ei drawn from a continuous distribution. We assume, for tractability, that
they have an Standard Gumbel distribution (extreme type I error distribution).11
These “non-pecuniary" value of the job could reflect individual preferences, but also other
elements such as location of job, hours, altruism, preference for job stability, or explicit costs
of accessing a job. For instance, a worker i of type e, working in sector x, has an utility
given by sum of the wage net of taxes and the “non-pecuniary" value, (1 − τ)wxe + νε
x,e
i ,
where τ is the income tax and ν captures the weight of the “non-pecuniary" value in the
individual preferences. Personality traits has been found to be an important determinant in
the selection into public employment (Maczulskij and Viinikainen, 2021). The non-pecuniary
value, εx,ei , does not reflect compensating differentials that are equally valued by all workers,
but is worker specific. It is a shortcut to capture all possible reasons that pushes people
to accept a job with lower wages (labour market conditions, housing market or transport
policies, as well as regulation of specific occupations). It is isomorphic to having it as a cost
of performing a job i.e. (1 − τ)wxe − νε
x,e
i . As such, the model is not equipped to make
any normative statement or to think about optimal policies. Our model accommodates the
10With a Cobb-Douglas production function, the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled
labor is equal to one. The values provided by Acemoglu and Autor (2011) range between 1.6 and 2.9.
However, underemployment disrupts the one-on-one mapping between education and skills used in the
production function. The empirical literature does not take into account the existence of underemployment,
which biases the empirical estimates. We provide here a benchmark exercise with a Cobb-Douglas function.
Using a CES production does not alter the qualitative results of our paper. Results are available upon
request.
11The probability density distribution is hump-shaped and the cumulative distribution function is an
exponential expression. This is useful because the difference of two Gumbel-distributed random variables
has a logistic distribution, which allows us to provide analytical results.
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traditional model in the limit where ν tends to zero and workers always select the highest
paying job.
4.2 A Malinvaud Government...
We assume that the government is required to produce a certain level of government services,
ḡ, taken as exogenous. Given a wage schedule, the government chooses its target (demanded)
level and composition of employment (jg,d1 and jg,d2 ), that minimizes the costs of producing
the government services, ḡ.
For clarity of the model, we assume an exogenous wage schedule for skilled and unskilled
jobs (wg1 and wg2). This is not a critical assumption. The critical assumption is that the
government wages do not adjust to equate supply and demand. We think this is a realistic
assumption, given that the government does not sell its goods and services and finances the
wage bill with taxes, so public-sector wages might be influenced by other factors, such as
unions, redistribution or elections. Notice that the wages are paid in units of the private-
sector good so they are essentially a transfer of resources from private- to public-sector
workers.12 We think this is realistic, given that most hiring decisions are decentralized, with
a weak scope to influence the wage schedule.
min
jg1 ,j
g
2
wg1j
g
1 + wg2jg2
s.t.
ḡ = (jg1)β(jg2)1−β.
Given the level of public wages, the government employs enough workers to maintain an
employment level capable of providing its services. Using the production function and the
two first-order conditions, we find the optimal ratio of skilled and unskilled target public-
sector jobs is:
jg,d1
jg,d2
= w
g
2
wg1
β
(1− β) , (3)
Plugging in the production function, the target level of jobs of each type is given by:
jg,d1 = ḡ
(
wg2
wg1
β
1−β
)1−β
, jg,d2 = ḡ
(
wg1
wg2
1−β
β
)β
. (4)
Lemma 1 If the government minimizes costs, the target skilled jobs, jg,d1 is increasing in w
g
2
and β and decreasing in wg1. The target unskilled jobs, j
g,d
2 is increasing in w
g
1 and decreasing
in wg2 and β. They are independent of private sector conditions.
12For the adamant reader concerned about the assumption of exogenous public wages, we present an
extension in Appendix E.1 where the government also chooses wages, but faces an additional union preference
constraint. This problem generates an endogenous public-sector premium that depends on an exogenous
union power and preference for wage compression, but does not change the labour market analysis. An
alternative approach, considered by de Córdoba et al. (2010) is to assume a Leviathan government with
preferences to expand both employment and wages with different weights.
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The first dimension of analysis is the government’s preferred choice of which workers
to hire. Taking the wage schedule and the production function as given, the government
chooses how many workers of the two types to minimize the costs of producing ḡ. Changes
in public wages are going to alter the labour demand choice of the government. Higher
unskill wages reduce the demand for unskilled jobs and raise demand for skilled jobs.
In a model without frictions, public-private wage differentials can pose some problems.
If it is positive, all workers would prefer the public sector, so one has to assume these jobs
are rationed. Perhaps harder to deal is the opposite case, where the differential is negative
and no worker would like to work for the government. Our preference structure avoids
this problem. It makes the supply of workers to the public sector continuous on the wage,
while preserving the different regimes. If their wages are higher, the government can attain
its target level of jobs, that are rationed. If the public-private wage differential is negative,
there would still be workers with high enough preference such that their supply is never zero.
Still, the supply of workers of a given type might be lower than the target level determined
by cost-minimization. In such cases, we assume the government hires more workers of the
other type to maintain the production of services.
The final assumption is that an educated worker that applies to an unskilled public job
always has priority over low-educated workers. The government is financed through a labour
income tax, τ . In the baseline model, we take it as exogenous, but, in Appendix E.3, we
discuss one extension in which τ adjusts to satisfy the government budget constraint. In
Appendix E.4, we also discuss the differences if we consider the government’s dual problem.
4.3 ... And A Walrasian Private Sector...
The representative firm maximizes profits. The labour market is perfectly competitive such
that the wages equate demand and supply and jobs are paid their marginal productivity.
The labour demand equations are
wp1 = α
(
jp2
jp1
)1−α
, wp2 = (1− α)
(
jp1
jp2
)α
. (5)
These standard inverse labour demand conditions show how the marginal productivity of
skilled and unskilled jobs depends only on their relative number. As the market is Walrasian,
we do not keep track of demand and supply subscript as they are always equal, regardless
of what happens in the public-sector labour market.
4.4 ... With Underemployment
The possibility of educated workers to do unskilled jobs creates a dissociation between the
number of educated workers and the number of skilled jobs, as well as the number of workers
with low education and the number of unskilled jobs. Some of the educated workers might
be under-employed in the public or private sector (ug, up) if they choose to. Hence, the
19
market clearing condition in high- and low-educated labour markets are given by
n = jg1 + jp1 + ug + up , 1− n = jg2 + jp2 − ug − up. (6)
4.5 Sorting
The total labour supply in the economy is exogenous in the sense that there is no disutility
of labour. However the labour supply to the public and private sectors is endogenous and
responds to wage differentials across sectors and jobs through two sorting conditions. An
educated worker i always has the possibility of going to private or public sector in a skilled
job, and might have an opportunity at an unskilled job in either sector. In a general
formulation, we consider that a fraction Ξg of educated workers has an opportunity at an
unskilled job in the public sector. Hence, these workers choose between three options:
Max{(1− τ)wp1 + νεp,1i , (1− τ)w
g
1 + νεg,1i , (1− τ)w
g
2 + νεg,2i }. (7)
Likewise, a fraction Ξp has one opportunity at an unskilled job in the private sector and
chooses between:
Max{(1− τ)wp1 + νεp,1i , (1− τ)w
p
2 + νεp,2i , (1− τ)w
g
1 + νεg,1i }. (8)
Finally, a fraction Ξb has opportunities at unskilled jobs in both sectors and chooses between
four options:
Max{(1− τ)wp1 + νεp,1i , (1− τ)w
p
2 + νεp,2i , (1− τ)w
g
1 + νεg,1i , (1− τ)w
g
2 + νεg,2i }. (9)
For analytical convenience, we now proceed with Ξb = 1 and Ξg = Ξp = 0, so all edu-
cated workers have four available options. We use the more general version for quantitative
purposes.
The fact that skilled jobs in the public sector might be rationed is important, given that
there might be fewer jobs available than workers wanting to work there at a given public
wage. We assume that workers that wished for but could not get a skilled public job, choose
the maximum between the three remaining options. Notice that this does not happen for
unskilled public jobs because we assume that they have priority over low-educated workers.13
We include one specific shock for each of the four possible jobs. One alternative would be
to consider a preference for public and private sectors and one for complex and simple jobs.
Not only would it be less tractable, it would also pose problems on how to identify the ν
for the public sector. Notice also that the preference is individual specific and cannot be
13It would technically be possible that the unskilled public wage would be so high that more educated
workers would want an unskilled public job than existing jobs; so that these jobs would be rationed too
ug = jg2 . We find that this case is only a theoretical curiosity with little empirical relevance.
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interpreted as a compensating differential. If there were other non-pecuniary characteristics
common to all public- sector workers, these could be added to wages as a separate term.14
A worker with low education only has a choice of a private or public unskilled job:
Max{(1− τ)wp2 + νεp,2i , (1− τ)w
g
2 + νεg,2i }. (10)
If the non-pecuniary value is drawn from a standard Gumbel distribution, the number
of high- and low-educated workers whose first choice is a public-sector job with the skill
requirement matching their education (denoted by jg,s1 and jg,s2 ) are given by:
jg,s1 = n
 e (1−τ)ν wg1
e
(1−τ)
ν
wg1 + e
(1−τ)
ν
wg2 + e
(1−τ)
ν
wp1 + e
(1−τ)
ν
wp2
 (11)
jg,s2 = (1− n)
 e (1−τ)ν wg2
e
(1−τ)
ν
wg2 + e
(1−τ)
ν
wp2
 (12)
These equations follow from the distributional assumption of εx,ei and are similar to the
well-know econometric multinomial-logit estimation. To better understand the different
regimes, for any given level of public-sector employment, we can define two endogenous
objects, w̃g1(jg1) and w̃g2(jg2), the implicit market clearing wages, or threshold wages that
allow the government to achieve that level of employment:
w̃g1(jg1) =
ν
(1− τ)
[
log(e
(1−τ)
ν
wg2 + e
(1−τ)
ν
wp1 + e
(1−τ)
ν
wp2 )− log(n− jg1)
]
(13)
w̃g2(jg2) =
ν
(1− τ)
[
log(e
(1−τ)
ν
wp2 )− log(1− n+ ug − jg2)
]
(14)
These two equations are derived using (11) and (12), setting jg,s1 = jg,d1 = jg1 and jg,s2 =
jg,d2 = jg2 and solving for the wages. If both public wages are above the implicit market
clearing wages – regime 1 – the number of interested workers is larger than the number of
jobs, so all public jobs are rationed and are determined by demand, jg1 = jg,d1 < jg,s1 and
jg2 = jg,d2 < (jg,s2 + ug). If one of the wages is below the threshold, in one market there are
fewer interested workers than jobs, so the government is constrained and supply determines
either jg1 or jg2 and the other adjusts to maintain the production of services (regimes 2 or 3).
Finally, if both wages are below the threshold, the government is constrained in both jobs, so
it is not able to maintain its government services, jg1 = jg,s1 < jg,d1 and jg2 = (jg,s2 +ug) < jg,d2 .
Independently of whether the government jobs are determined by supply or demand,
14If anything, adding a common compensating differentials in the public sector would strengthen the
underemployment channel as they would make the unskilled public-sector job even more attractive relative
to the private sector. Similarly, if the preferences featured risk aversion, the underemployment channel would
also be amplified as small differences in the unskilled wages of public and private sectors would translate
into larger differences in utility.
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underemployment in the two sectors is pinned down by
up = (n− jg1)
 e (1−τ)ν wp2
e
(1−τ)
ν
wg2 + e
(1−τ)
ν
wp1 + e
(1−τ)
ν
wp2
 (15)
ug = (n− jg1)
 e (1−τ)ν wg2
e
(1−τ)
ν
wg2 + e
(1−τ)
ν
wp1 + e
(1−τ)
ν
wp2
 (16)
Notice that, when wg2 = wp2, up = ug independently of the size of the public and private
sectors. This means that the underemployment rate in the private sector (ũp = up
jp2
) would
differ from the one prevailing in the public sector (ũg = ug
jg2
), unless the two sector were of
exactly the same size. In the quantitative exercise, we consider a variation of the sorting
problem such that, when wg2 = wp2, the model generates ũp = ũg.15
For the interested reader, we show in Appendix B a version of the two-sector model
without underemployment and perfect labour mobility, and in Appendix C a 1-sector model
of underemployment where we discuss some comparative statics, namely with respect to the
tax rate and the supply of educated workers. These two Appendices develop the intuition
and isolate the mechanisms present in the model. Garibaldi et al. (2020), analyse a one-
sector model, considering both under and over employment, to measure the output losses of
mismatch across OECD economies.
4.6 Equilibrium Definition
Definition 1 An equilibrium consists of private-sector wages {wp1, w
p
2}, private-sector jobs
{jp1 , j
p
2}, public-sector jobs {j
g
1 , j
g
2}, and underemployment in the two sectors {up, ug}, such
that, given some exogenous wage policies, technology and composition of the labour force
{wg1, w
g
2, τ, ν, ḡ, α, β, n}, the following apply.
1. Private-sector firms maximizes profits (5).
2. Employment in the government is set either: i) if unconstrained (demand determined),
by minimizing the costs of providing government services:
Regime 1
 j
g
1 = jg,d1 < jg,s1 if wg1 ≥ w̃g1(jg,d1 )
jg2 = jg,d2 < (jg,s2 + ug) wg2 ≥ w̃g2(jg,d2 )
(17)
ii) if constrained in one of the markets (partly supply determined), to maintain the
production of government services:
Regime 2

jg1 = jg,s1 < jg,d1 if wg1 < w̃g1(jg,d1 )
jg2 =
[
ḡ
(jg1 )β
] 1
1−β < (jg,s2 + ug) wg2 ≥ w̃g2(jg2)
(18)
15This requires Ξg = j
g
2
jp2 +j
g
2
, Ξp = j
p
2
jp2 +j
g
2
and Ξb = 0, but does not allow clear analytical results.
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Regime 3
 j
g
1 =
[
ḡ
(jg2 )1−β
] 1
β < jg,s1 if w
g
1 ≥ w̃
g
1(jg1)
jg2 = (jg,s2 + ug) < jg,d2 wg2 < w̃g2(jg,d2 )
(19)
iii) if constrained in both markets (fully supply determined):
Regime 4
 j
g
1 = jg,s1 < jg,d1 if wg1 < w̃g1(jg,d1 )
jg2 = (jg,s2 + ug) < jg,d2 wg2 < w̃g2(jg,d2 )
(20)
3. High- and low- educated workers sort across labour markets according to (9) and (10).
4. Markets clear (6).
5 Solving The Model Under Different Regimes
5.1 Regime 1 - Unconstrained Government
This equilibrium requires that wg1 ≥ w̃g1(jg,d1 ) and wg2 ≥ w̃g2(jg,d2 ). Given that jg1 = jg,d1 and
jg2 = jg,d2 are only function of the exogenous public-sector wages and technology, the solution
of the model under regime 1 can be written in three equations in u = up + ug, wp1 and wp2
u = (n− jg1)
 e (1−τ)ν wp2 + e (1−τ)ν wg2
e
(1−τ)
ν
wg2 + e
(1−τ)
ν
wp1 + e
(1−τ)
ν
wp2
 (21)
wp1 = α
(
1− n− jg2 + u
n− jg1 − u
)1−α
, (22)
wp2 = (1− α)
(
n− jg1 − u
1− n− jg2 + u
)α
, (23)
We can further substitute the two wages, and have one equation in one unknown with the
left-hand side increasing in u and the right-hand side decreasing in u. We show in Appendix
D that the equilibrium exists and is unique, as well as the full system determining the total
derivatives of the endogenous variables to the key exogenous variables.
Proposition 1 Under regime 1, an increase of wg2 shifts the composition in the public sector
towards skilled jobs and in the private sector to unskilled jobs. It raises skilled wages and
lowers unskilled wages in the private sector. The effect on underemployment is ambiguous
( du
dw2g
≶ 0, dw
p
1
dwg2
> 0, dw
p
2
dwg2
< 0, dj
g
1
dwg2
> 0, dj
g
2
dwg2
< 0).
Proposition 2 Under regime 1, an increase of wg1 shifts the composition in the public sector
towards unskilled jobs and in the private sector to skilled jobs. It raises unskilled wages and
lowers skilled wages in the private sector. It raises underemployment ( du
dw1g
> 0 , dw
p
1
dwg1
< 0,
dwp2
dwg1
> 0, dj
g
1
dwg1
< 0, dj
g
2
dwg1 > 0).
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The propositions tell us how public wages affect the private sector. The effect of an
increase of wg2 on underemployment is ambiguous. While there is a direct positive effect
on underemployment in the public sector, the higher wage inequality in the private sector,
has a negative indirect effect on both private and public underemployment. The effect on
underemployment of an increase in wg1 is unambiguously positive. By reducing private-sector
wage inequality it fosters underemployment in both sectors.
We can write expressions for the elasticities of private wages with respect to public wages.
For instance, elasticities with respect to unskilled public wages are given by:
dwp1
dwg2
wg2
wp1
= (1− α)(1− β)j
g
1
jp1
+ (1− α)β j
g
2
jp2
+ du
dwg2
[
(1− α)
jp2
+ (1− α)
jp1
]
wg2 (24)
dwp2
dwg2
wg2
wp2
= −α(1− β)j
g
1
jp1
− αβ j
g
2
jp2
− du
dwg2
[
α
jp2
+ α
jp1
]
wg2 (25)
These expressions provide a decomposition of the effects of public wages. Higher unskilled
public wages induce the government to open more skilled jobs and fewer unskilled jobs. In
turn, this means there is a shortage of educated workers (first term) and an excess of low-
educated workers (second term) in the private sector, both pushing skilled wages up and
unskilled wages down. Finally, there is an effect on underemployment. If underemployment
increases, both the positive effect on skilled wages and the negative effect on unskilled wages
are reinforced. If underemployment decreases, they are mitigated.
5.2 Regime 2 - Skilled Public-Sector Wages Too Low
This is a potentially realistic regime. Regime 2 occurs if wages for skilled jobs are too low,
wg1 < w̃
g
1(jg,d1 ). The government cannot hire its target level of employment so, to maintain
the production of government services it has to open more unskilled jobs (provided it still
pays high enough wages, wg2 ≥ w̃g2(jg2)). The public jobs for the two types are given by
jg1 = jg,s1 , jg2 =
[
ḡ
(jg1 )β
] 1
1−β . (26)
The three equations pinning down u, wp1 and wp2 are the same as in regime 1, but now
they affect both jg1 and jg2 that are no longer independent. In Appendix D, we show the full
system determining the total derivatives of the endogenous variables to the key exogenous
variables.
Proposition 3 Under regime 2, an increase of wg2 raises skilled wages and lowers unskilled
wages in the private sector. The effect on underemployment and in the skill mix of the public
sector is ambiguous ( du
dw2g
≶ 0, dw
p
1
dwg2
> 0, dw
p
2
dwg2
< 0, dj
g
1
dwg2
≶ 0, dj
g
2
dwg2
≶ 0).
Proposition 4 Under regime 2, an increase of wg1 shifts the composition in the public sector
towards skilled jobs and in the private sector to unskilled jobs. It raises skilled wages and
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lowers unskilled wages in the private sector. It lowers underemployment ( du
dw1g
< 0 , dw
p
1
dwg1
> 0,
dwp2
dwg1
< 0, dj
g
1
dwg1
> 0, dj
g
2
dwg1 < 0).
In this case public-sector employment is supply determined so the signs of the effect of
public-sector wages on private-sector wages are the opposite of those in regime 1. Increasing
wages at the top allows the government to attract more educated workers.
5.3 Regime 3 - Unskilled Public-Sector Wages Too Low
Regime 3 happens if unskilled public wages are too low, wg2 < w̃g2(jg,d2 ). The government
cannot hire its target level of employment so, to maintain the production of government
services, it has to open more skilled jobs (requiring that wg1 ≥ w̃g1(jg1)). While this case is
not realistic, we consider it for completeness. The public employment is given by
jg2 = ug + jg,s2 , jg1 =
[
ḡ
(jg2 )1−β
] 1
β . (27)
5.4 Regime 4 - Public Sector Breaks Down
Regime 4 occurs if both public wages are too low, wg1 < w̃g1(jg,d1 ) and wg2 < w̃g2(jg,d2 ). All
government jobs are determined by supply. The government cannot hire enough workers to
maintain the production of government services, so they have to be scaled down.
jg1 = jg,s1 , jg2 = ug + jg,s2 . (28)
And the government services that are allowed is given by g = (jg1)β(jg2)1−β.
6 Quantitative analysis
6.1 Model with Alternative Sorting Mechanism and Exogenous
Income Tax
For quantitative purposes, we consider a more general sorting mechanism. One of the
features of the baseline model is that when wages are equal in the two sectors, their level
of underemployment is equal. Thus, if the public sector is smaller than the private, their
underemployment rate would be larger. As such, even in the case of symmetry between
the two sectors in terms of wages and technology, the ratio of public-employment shares is
not 1. We thus consider an alternative sorting mechanism whereby the underemployment
opportunities are proportional to the dimension of each sector (Ξg = j
g
2
jp2 +j
g
2
, Ξp = j
p
2
jp2 +j
g
2
and
Ξb = 0.). This is sufficient to generate equal underemployment rates and a ratio of public
employment shares of 1 when both wages and technology are equal across sectors.
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The equations of the model with the alternative sorting mechanism are shown in Ap-
pendix D.3. Of all the educated workers, a fraction Ξg has an underemployment oppor-
tunity only in the public sector. Those workers choose between three options Max{wp1 +
νεp,1i , w
g
1 + νεg,1i , w
g
2 + νεg,2i }. The remaining fraction Ξp = 1−Ξg has only an underemploy-
ment opportunity in the private sector and chooses betweenMax{wp1 +νεp,1i , w
g
1 + νεg,1i , w
p
2 +
νεp,2i }. While Ξg and Ξp could be in principle any number between 0 and 1, we assume that it
is equal to the fraction of unskilled jobs that belong to the government, Ξg = j
g
2
jp2 +j
g
2
to gener-
ate equal underemployment rates in the two sectors in the symmetric case. The mechanism is
similar to the baseline model except that equation (21), that determines underemployment,
becomes more complex.
Furthermore, we take into account an exogenous income tax τ in the baseline model.
The tax rate has the same effect as a change in ν, the weight of the non-pecuniary element
of preferences. The income tax rate is taken as a parameter assumed constant even in the
quantitative experiments carried out in this section. The justification is that we considered
that such policies would be financed with government debt or by adjustments in other
spending categories. We take into account the endogenous response of income tax in an
extensions shown in section E.3
6.2 Calibration
We calibrate the more general version of model to the United States. The model has seven
parameters {wg1, wg2, ν1−τ , ḡ, α, β, n}. As such, we set them to target seven moments of the
data, all described in Section 3. Table 3 summarizes the parameter values and target values.
We set n to match 43.2 percent of college graduates. The parameters ḡ and β target
a public employment of 0.097 and 0.062 of college and non-college, as a proportion of the
Table 3: Calibration
Parameter Value Variable Description Model Data
Targeted
α 0.450 w
p
1
wp2
College premium (private sector) 1.580 1.580
β 0.657 jg1 + ug Public employment of college 0.097 0.097
ḡ 0.082 jg2 − ug Public employment of no-college 0.062 0.062
n 0.432 n Percentage of college workers 0.432 0.432
wg1 0.652
wg1
wp1
Public-sector wage premium (college) 1.010 1.010
wg2 0.440
wg2
wp2
Public-sector wage premium (no-college) 1.077 1.077
ν
1−τ 0.142
u
jg2 +j
p
2
Underemployment rate (economy) 0.089 0.089
Not Targeted
ug
jg2
Underemployment rate (public) 0.105 0.102
up
jp2
Underemployment rate (private) 0.087 0.087
Note: Underemployment rate statistics are calculated from PIACC and are shown in Figure 6. The re-
maining data is calculated from the CPS, 1996 to 2018. The public employment of college and no-college is
shown in Figure 2. Public-sector wage premium is shown in the first two columns of Table 2. The college
premium in the private sector is estimated by regressing the log of hourly wages of private workers on a
college dummy, controlling for age, gender, region, year and a part-time dummy.
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employed population, taken from the CPS. Notice that the employment of no-college public
workers is equal to jg2−ug while the employment of public workers with college is jg1 +ug. The
parameter α targets a college premium of private workers of 58 percent found by regressing
the log of hourly wages of private workers on a college dummy, controlling for age, gender,
region, year and a part-time dummy, for a sample between 1996 and 2018.
One important point that our model raises is that the observed public wage premium
for college workers might be understated if not controlling for occupation, as it includes
underemployed workers. We target the coefficient from Table 2, of the regressions in which
we control for two digit occupations, meaning a public-private wage rate for both unskilled
jobs of w
g
2
wp2
= 1.077 and for skilled jobs of w
g
1
wp1
= 1.010. We cannot dissociate the weight of
the preference shock in sorting, ν, from the income tax rate. We set ν1−τ , such that the
underemployment rate is 0.089, the number found for the US using PIAAC data.
Under the calibration, the US economy is in regime 1, where wages are high enough such
that the government hiring is unrestricted. Table 3 also displays additional non-targeted
moments : underemployment rates in the private and public sectors. Underemployment
rates in both sectors are very close to the data, which suggests that the model provides a
good fit along these dimensions.
6.3 What Drives The Public-Sector Education Bias?
The first exercise shows whether the public-sector education bias is driven by technology
or by the combination of the wage policy and excess underemployment (Table 4). Column
(1) shows the values of variables in the data and Column (2) the values under the main
calibration. Column (3) shows the counterfactual values when there are no differences
across sectors in terms of wages (wg1 = wp1 and wg2 = wp2). Column (4) equates both wages
and technology (β = α). In that case, the public and private sector have the same skill
mix (this would not happen in the baseline model): the government hires 16.6 percent of
both types of workers, the underemployment rates in both sectors are equal and the public
employment shares ratio and the education intensity ratios are both be equal to 1.
Switching off only the wage differences across sectors, imply cutting public wages by 1.4
percent for skilled and 6.8 percent for unskilled jobs. In this scenario, the underemployment
rate is equal in both sectors. This reduces the share of public employment for college
graduates by 0.6 percentage point. It would lower the public employment shares ratio from
2.05 to 1.9, roughly 15 percent of the difference to 1. It would lower the education intensity
ratio from 1.53 to 1.47, 12 percent of the difference to 1.
In Appendix F we present decomposition for the UK, France and Spain, together with
one exercise using the baseline model instead of the model with alternative sorting. In the
UK, the wage profile and underemployment account for only 3 percent of the education bias,
which might be explained by a larger weight of the health and education industries, that
required more qualified workers. In contrast, in France and Spain, the wages schedule and
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Table 4: Decomposition of public-sector employment education bias
Variable Data Baseline Equating Equating wages
wages and technology
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public employment shares
Skilled 0.224 0.224 0.218 (10%) 0.166
Unskilled 0.109 0.109 0.115 (11%) 0.166
Ratio 2.054 2.054 1.892 (15%) 1.000
Education intensity
Public 0.610 0.610 0.590 (11%) 0.432
Private 0.399 0.399 0.402 (10%) 0.432
Ratio 1.530 1.530 1.468 (12%) 1.000
Underemployment rate
Total 0.089 0.089 0.090 0.116
Public* 0.102 0.105 0.090 0.116
Private* 0.087 0.087 0.090 0.116
Column (2) displays the statistics simulated from the model. Column (3) displays the statistics from a
simulation where public-sector wages are equal to private-sector wages for the two types of jobs. Column
(4) displays the statistics from a simulation where public-sector wages are equal to private-sector wages for
the two types of jobs and β = α. In parenthesis we show the percentage of the gap between columns (4) and
(2) covered by only equating wages. * statistics not calibrated.
underemployment account for between 13 and 19 percent.
Using the baseline sorting mechanism, the wage schedule and excess underemployment
explain more than 80 percent of the difference between the data and the symmetric case.
This high number reflects the fact that, with the baseline sorting mechanism, underemploy-
ment in the public sector is much more sensitive to unskilled public wages. For instance,
for the starting calibration, the underemployment rate in the public sector is larger than 30
percent and that of the private sector lower than 5 percent.
6.4 Elasticities of Private-Sector Wages
We now focus on the price implications of the education bias in the public sector. We
calculate the elasticities of private wages, with respect to public wages. To our knowledge,
the empirical literature does not provide estimates of these elasticities. Empirical research
investigates public-private wage gap or provides evidence on aggregate wage spillovers, rather
than focusing on skilled and unskilled workers like in our paper. Our model suggests that
the elasticities of private wages, with respect to public wages, depends on the skill-mix in the
public sector and the extent of underemployment in each sector, which suggests interesting
avenues to explore in future empirical research.
As in equations (24) and (25), we can decompose the elasticities of private wages, with
respect to public wages into three components. The first two relate to the adjustment of the
skill-mix in the public sector. Higher unskilled public wages alter the government skill-mix
towards skilled jobs, hence employing fewer low-educated workers. The first component
measures the impact of the shortage of high-educated workers in the private sector. It is
positive for private skilled wages and negative for unskilled wages. Similarly, the excess low-
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Table 5: Elasticities Of Private-Sector Wages
Variable Elasticity Decomposition
Shortage of skilled Excess unskilled Underemployment
Elasticity of private wages w.r.t. unskilled public wages
dwp1
dwg2
wg2
wp1
0.074 0.059 0.045 -0.029
dwp2
dwg2
wg2
wp2
-0.061 -0.048 -0.037 0.024
Elasticity of private wages w.r.t. skilled public wages
dwp1
dwg1
wg1
wp1
-0.046 -0.059 -0.045 0.058
dwp2
dwg1
wg1
wp2
0.038 0.048 0.037 -0.047
Elasticity of private wages w.r.t. public wages
dwp1
dwg
wg
wp1
0.029 0.000 0.000 0.029
dwp2
dwg
wg
wp2
-0.023 0.000 0.000 -0.023
Note: the first column is calculated numerically, the decomposition is based on equations (24) and (25).
educated workers has a positive effect on skilled wages and negative effect on unskilled wages,
as measured by the second term. These two effects would exist in a model without underem-
ployment. The contribution of underemployment is measured in the third component, that
depends on whether higher unskilled public wages increase or decrease underemployment,
which we could not pin down analytically. Hence, we calculate the elasticities and the three
components numerically, shown in Table 5.
An increase of one percent in unskilled public wages translates into an increase of 0.07
percent of skilled private wages and a reduction of 0.06 percent in unskilled private wages,
increasing wage inequality in the private sector. We can see that the presence of under-
employment contributes to mitigating the effect. Higher unskilled public wages raise un-
deremployment in the public sector but reduce it in the private sector. The overall effect
is negative. Our model suggests that reduced wage inequality in the public sector actually
increases wage inequality in the private sector. Borjas (2003) conjectures that public-sector
wage compression after the 1970s in the US might have also played a role in the widening
of the private-sector wage distribution, in addition to technology and globalization. Our
model provides the economic mechanisms to understand Borjas (2003)’s intuition.
An increase of one percent in skilled public wages translates into a reduction of 0.05
percent of skilled private wages and an increase in 0.04 percent of unskilled private wages.
Again underemployment mitigates the effect.
The last rows show the elasticity of private wages to an increase of both skilled and
unskilled wages. In this case, there is no change in the skill-mix of the government, so all
the effects come from underemployment. Still, increasing proportionally wages in the public
sector has an asymmetric effect. The increase in underemployment in the public sector is
larger than the fall in underemployment in the private sector so overall underemployment
increases, which raises skilled wages and lowers unskilled wages in the private sector.
In Appendix F, we present the same exercise for the UK, France and Spain, as well as
using the baseline model instead of the model with alternative sorting. Given the higher
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share of public employment in the UK and France, their elasticities are up to four times
larger than in the US. For instance, in UK (France), an increase of one percent in the
unskilled public wages raises private skilled wages by 0.21 (0.14) percent and lowers private
unskilled wages by 0.06 (0.06).
Using the baseline model, the elasticities are also higher. An increase of one percent
in public wages raises private skilled wages by 0.21 and lowers unskilled wages by 0.2.
The difference is driven by underemployment. Under the baseline model, higher unskilled
public wages raises underemployment, because the direct positive effect on public-sector
underemployment largely dominates the negative effect on private underemployment. In the
model with alternative sorting, as the set of underemployment opportunities on the public
sector is restricted, the positive effect is mitigated and the negative effect is amplified.
6.5 Switching Regimes
Although in this quantitative exercise, the US economy is in regime 1, we think the idea
of switching regimes is very realistic. Borjas (2003) documents the differential shifts that
occurred in the wage structures of the public and private sectors between 1960 and 2000. He
concludes that "as the wage structure in the public sector became relatively more compressed,
the public sector found it harder to attract and retain high-skill workers. In short, the
substantial widening of wage inequality in the private sector and the relatively more stable
wage distribution in the public sector created “magnetic effects” that altered the sorting
of workers across sectors, with high-skill workers becoming more likely to end up in the
private sector." Similar concerns were also raised during the recent experience of European
countries subject to austerity packages. Several countries implemented austerity measures
that included public sector wage cuts. However, most governments opted for asymmetric
cuts, centered on the highest earners, instead of reforms aligning the wage distribution with
that of the private sector.16 As a result of the relative wage compression, the public sector
found it increasingly more difficult to attract and retain high-skill workers. 17
Our definition of equilibrium covered four regimes. Figure 7 shows which regime is
in place depending on the wage policy. The US economy is in the unconstrained regime
where both the skilled and unskilled public wages are high enough. Only cuts larger than
25 percent in skilled wages or larger than 50 percent for unskilled wages would push the
economy to one of the three other regimes. Still, we perform numerical exercises varying
16In Portugal in 2012, the wage cuts were 22 percent on the highest earners and zero percent on the
lowest. In Spain in 2010, they were 10 percent on top and zero at the bottom. In Ireland in 2010, the cuts
where 15 percent at the top and 5 percent at the bottom.
17To illustrate this point, we calibrate the model with a more restricted definition of educated workers,
than only includes workers with an Msc., Professional or PhD degree. These correspond to 9 percent of the
US employed population, of which one third are hired by the government. The public-sector wage premium
for these workers is -4 percent. The calibration and the results are shown in Appendix G. We found this
economy to be in regime 2, where the government is constrained by the supply of educated workers. This
can explain why in Figure 1 the share of public employment is increasing on education for workers until
MSc, but falls for workers with PhD.
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skilled and unskilled public wages across regimes.
Figure 8 shows the effects of varying skilled public wages. The kink observed for wage
cuts above 25 percent is the switching from regime 1 to regime 2. When government em-
ployment switches to become supply determined, the sign of the effects on private wages,
underemployment, education intensity and public employment shares ratios switches. Par-
ticularly interesting is that wage cuts above 25 percent also raise government spending. By
lowering the skilled public wages in regime 1, the government reduces spending. But when
lowering wages implies that fewer educated workers are attracted to public jobs and the
government has to open more unskilled positions (relative more expensive), it generates an
inefficient skill mix that is more costly.
Figure 9 shows the effects of varying unskilled public wages, for the main calibration
(regime 1, dark line) and for one where public skilled wages are 35 percent lower (regime
2, light line). In both regimes, higher unskilled public wages raise the education intensity
and public employment shares ratios. It also pushes private skilled wages up and unskilled
wages down, raising inequality (with a larger slope in regime 1). The one variable that is
affected differently by unskilled public wages in the two regimes is underemployment. Higher
unskilled wages lower total underemployment in regime 1 because of the large quantitative
effects on private-sector inequality, which reduces the incentive of being underemployed. In
regime 2, higher unskilled public-sector wages do not reduce directly the number of unskilled
jobs of the government (because the government is not able to substitute away from unskilled
labour) so they simply foster underemployment in the public-sector.
6.6 Extensions
In Appendix E, we analyse four extensions of the model. We show that these extensions do
not modify the key insights from the baseline model, and sometimes reinform them through
additional mechanisms. First, we endogeneize public-sector wages, based on the presence of
a union constraint. Second, we consider that educated workers have heterogeneous ability.
We show that the high-ability educated workers are less likely to be underemployed and,
if the government does not fully reward their efficiency units like the private sector, they
are less likely to go to the public-sector, which reinforces the education bias. Third, we
consider a model with endogenous tax rate, which simply adds another equation reflecting
the government budget constraint. Finally, we consider the government’s dual problem that
gives a slightly different solution.18
18Although we have worked out others, we abstract from discussing the ones that add little to the
mechanism (i.e considering a CES production function or introducing capital).
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Figure 7: Regimes as a Function of the Public-Sector Wage Schedule
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Figure 8: Effects of Public-sector Skilled Wages
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7 Conclusion
We present a simple two-sector model with underemployment that highlights the main trade-
off regarding public wages, without modeling search frictions. The theory highlights three
channels to rationalize why public employment is so biased towards educated: technology,
the public wage profile and excess underemployment. We find that in the US economy the
excess hiring of educated workers in the public sector is mainly accounted for by technology,
while the wage policy and excess underemployment account for 15 percent.
We also find that the public wage policy is a crucial driver of private sector inequality:
more wage compression in the public sector raises inequality in the private sector. A one
percent increase in unskilled public wages raises skilled private wages by 0.07 percent and
lowers unskilled private wages by 0.06 percent. Given a variation of the public-sector wage
premium of 20 percentage points across US states, the variation of this policy alone can
determine a variation of 2.6 percentage points in the college premium. It has been docu-
mented that governments are concerned with inequality when setting their wage policies.
For instance, during the Euro Area crisis, many governments implemented wage cuts for
their highest paid workers, and spared workers with lower wages, on the grounds that fur-
ther cuts at the bottom would worsen inequalities. We show that this well intended policy
can backfire. Higher wage compression shifts demand from workers with low to workers with
high education and worsens underemployment in the public sector. As a consequence, the
skill-mix in the private sector shifts towards low-educated workers, so their wages fall while
skilled private wages go up. While decreasing wage inequality for a sub-set of workers, such
policies increase wage inequality for everyone else.
Labour economists were very active, between the 1970s and the 1990s, studying public-
sector employment, in particular from an applied angle. We believe that our basic framework
can help us think about public employment and revive its study. Our view is that public
wages are not set by a Walrasian auctioneer, but are the outcome of various complex decision
processes, with consequences in the labour market. Despite its simplicity, the model reveals
quite complex mechanisms about the public sector. When public wages do not equate
supply and demand of government jobs, different regimes arise. We have shown that the
effects of government policies on the private sector are profoundly different, whether we are
in a regime where public employment is demand determined or in a regime where public
employment is supply determined. While this switching between regimes did not interfere
with the quantitative results on the decomposition, we think it is a defining feature of public-
sector labour markets. Given the substantial variation of public wage across US states or
across countries, we think it could explain variations in labour market and fiscal outcomes.
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A Additional Statistics
Figure A.1: Public-Sector Employment Share by Education, Different Dimensions
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Figure A.2: College share by sector, Different Dimensions
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Figure A.3: College Share by Sector, Across Industries and Occupations
Industries
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
S
ha
re
 o
f s
ec
to
ra
l e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
FR
 −
 E
du
ca
tio
n
FR
 −
 H
ea
lth
FR
 −
 R
es
t
UK
 −
 E
du
ca
tio
n
UK
 −
 H
ea
lth
UK
 −
 R
es
t
UK
 −
 T
ra
ns
po
rt
US
 −
 H
ea
lth
 a
nd
 E
du
ca
tio
n
US
 −
 R
es
t
College employment share by sector
Public Private
1
1.
2
1.
4
1.
6
1.
8
R
at
io
FR
 −
 E
du
ca
tio
n
FR
 −
 H
ea
lth
FR
 −
 R
es
t
UK
 −
 E
du
ca
tio
n
UK
 −
 H
ea
lth
UK
 −
 R
es
t
UK
 −
 T
ra
ns
po
rt
US
 −
 H
ea
lth
 a
nd
 E
du
ca
tio
n
US
 −
 R
es
t
(share of college in public sector relative to the share in private sector)
Education intensity ratio
3-digit Occupations
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
S
ha
re
 o
f s
ec
to
ra
l e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
14
3
81
7
81
6
96
1
81
1
71
1
62
2
75
4
94
1
51
3
83
4
93
2
51
4
93
1
71
3
75
1
83
2
92
1
91
1
34
3
52
1
52
3
51
5
81
2
81
5
93
3
75
3
71
2
96
2
72
1
53
2
81
4
73
2
51
6
72
3
83
5
31
3
83
1
72
2
51
1
41
3
82
1
44
1
41
1
74
1
42
2
52
4
43
2
42
1
31
2
53
1
43
1
81
8
14
1
34
1
81
3
54
1
33
1
61
1
73
1
33
4
32
5
32
2
52
2
35
2
62
1
31
1
74
2
75
2
35
1
13
1
33
3
13
2
33
5
31
4
31
5
34
2
33
2
32
1
12
2
24
2
11
1
26
5
25
1
25
2
12
1
24
1
21
7
21
2
24
3
13
3
26
4
21
6
26
2
23
5
22
4
13
4
21
5
22
6
21
4
22
2
21
1
23
4
23
1
26
3
21
3
26
1
23
3
22
1
22
5
91
2
College employment share by sector
Public Private
.2
.6
1
1.
4
1.
8
2.
2
2.
6
3
R
at
io
14
3
81
7
51
4
81
6
81
1
62
2
51
1
96
1
51
3
31
5
52
1
51
5
51
6
35
2
33
1
25
1
24
2
71
3
34
1
83
5
24
1
44
1
22
6
26
1
26
5
13
3
32
2
96
2
22
4
22
1
22
2
26
2
21
3
53
2
21
4
22
5
23
1
21
1
23
3
32
5
21
2
21
7
26
4
21
5
41
3
25
2
26
3
41
1
52
4
33
4
14
1
11
1
71
1
43
1
35
1
42
2
12
2
32
1
74
1
33
2
72
3
12
1
13
4
21
6
83
2
75
4
83
1
31
4
31
1
34
2
42
1
83
4
31
2
34
3
75
3
13
2
75
1
23
4
52
2
31
3
94
1
23
5
33
5
74
2
24
3
72
1
13
1
53
1
93
1
52
3
93
2
33
3
73
1
54
1
73
2
93
3
92
1
43
2
81
2
81
3
81
4
71
2
81
8
72
2
82
1
91
1
81
5
61
1
62
1
75
2
91
2
(share of college in public sector relative to the share in private sector)
Education intensity ratio
Note: 1st panel uses French, Spanish, UK Labour Force Surveys and the CPS. 2nd panel: CPS data, average
between 1996 and 2018. 3-digit occupations that have an overall share of public-sector employment between
0.05 and 0.95.
Figure A.4: Compression, Over Time, Across Countries
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Structure of Earning Survey (2002, 2006, 2010, 2014) and CPS data between 2006 and 2018.
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A.1 Details on PIACC data
The OECD Survey of Adult Skills is part of the Program for the International Assessment
of Adult Competencies (PIAAC). The data were collected between 2011 and 2015. In
each country, the survey includes socio-demographic information (gender, education), labor
market status and assesses the proficiency of adults aged between 16 and 65 in literacy,
numeracy and problem solving.
The sample includes only respondents who are currently employed (C_D05 Current Em-
ployment Status is "Employed"). As in McGowan and Andrews (2015), to identify workers
who are neither over-qualified, nor under-qualified, we use 2 questions in the survey asking
workers to compare their skill level and that required for their job: "Do you feel that you
have the skills to cope with more demanding duties than those you are required to perform
in your current job?" (F_Q07a) and "Do you feel that you need further training in order
to cope well with your present duties?" (F_Q07b). Workers who neither feel they have the
skills to perform a more demanding job nor feel the need for further training in order to
be able to perform their current job satisfactorily are considered as well-matched. These
workers provide a reference for the educational attainment that is required to perform the
job within each (1-digit) occupation. For a given occupation, in a given country, we compute
the mean and standard deviation of years of completed education of well-matched workers.
Underemployed workers are those who report years of education that lie 1.96 standard de-
viation above the average number of years of education of well-matched workers in a given
(isco1) occupation. The resulting underemployment rates are reported in Figure 6.
We repeat the exercise by looking at underemployment in the public and private sectors.
Respondents are identified as public-sector workers using the question on "which sector of
the economy do you work?" (D_Q03). The public sector includes: all parts of the public
administration at the national, regional or local levels; public services provided by the
state or from state funds (including publicly run schools, hospitals, universities, etc.); and
publicly-owned companies.
In the top panel of Figure A.5, underemployed workers are those who report years of
education that lie 1 standard deviation above the average number of years of education of
well-matched workers in a given (isco1) occupation.
In the middle and bottom panel of Figure A.5, college workers are those who report an
educational attainment of ISCED 5B (First stage of tertiary education: typically shorter,
more practical, technical specific programmes leading to professional qualifications.) and
higher. We then compute the share of non-college workers within each occupation (isco 1
in middle panel of Figure A.5, isco 2 in bottom panel of Figure A.5). A college-educated
worker is classified as underemployed when 2 conditions are met: 1) she is not well-matched
and 2) working in an occupation that is majority non-college.
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Figure A.5: Underemployment Rates, Alternative Calculation Methods
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Note: Source: PIAAC. Top panel : underemployed workers are workers whose years of education are
1 s.d. above the mean years of education of well-matched workers in their occupation. Middle panel :
underemployed workers are college graduates that are not well-matched and work in 1-digit occupations that
are majority non-college. Bottom panel: underemployed workers are college graduates that are not well-
matched and work in 2-digit occupations that are majority non-college. 2-digit occupations are not available
in Austria and Finland.
43
B Two-Sector Model Without Underemployment
Technology and Preferences
We present a two-sector model that features a labour market with free mobility. There
are two types of individuals with high (1) and low (2) education. The supply of educated
individuals in the economy is indicated with n, while the supply of the low-educated workers
is indicated with 1− n. The representative firm produces a private sector output y and the
government produces services g with constant return technology:
y = (jp1)α(jp2)1−α , g = (jg1)β(jg2)1−β. (B.1)
Individuals only value wages, so they chose the highest paying job. If the public sector
pays a higher wage than the private sector, these jobs would be preferred and would be
rationed. If the public sector pays lower wages, no one would work there. As such, the only
equilibrium without rationing, implies that the wages in the two sectors have to equate.
Government
We assume that the government follows the same minimization problem, determining the
target (ideal) level and composition of employment (jg,d1 and jg,d2 ), given by.
jg,d1 = ḡ
(
wg2
wg1
β
1−β
)1−β
, jg,d2 = ḡ
(
wg1
wg2
1−β
β
)β
. (B.2)
Private Sector
The representative private sector firm maximizes profits as in the baseline model:
wp1 = α
(
jp2
jp1
)1−α
, wp2 = (1− α)
(
jp1
jp2
)α
. (B.3)
And the market clearing conditions are now
n = jg1 + jp1 , 1− n = jg2 + jp2 . (B.4)
Equilibrium
Definition 2 A steady-state equilibrium consists of private-sector wages {wp1, w
p
2}, private-
sector jobs {jp1 , j
p
2}, public-sector jobs {j
g
1 , j
g
2}, such that, given an exogenous wage policies,
technology and composition of the labour force {wg1, w
g
2, ḡ, α, β, n}, the following apply.
1. Private-sector firms maximizes profits.
2. Government:
(a) If unconstrained by supply: minimizes costs of providing government services.
(b) If constrained by supply: maintains production of government services.
3. Workers sort across labour markets optimally.
4. Markets clear.
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The model can be written in two equations in wp1 and wp2, as a function of public-sector
employment jg1 and jg2 .
wp1 = α
(
1− n− jg2
n− jg1
)1−α
, (B.5)
wp2 = (1− α)
(
n− jg1
1− n− jg2
)α
, (B.6)
Regime 1: Wages are High Enough in Public Sector
This is the case where public employment is demand determined. Jobs are rationed so
workers who do not get a job in the public sector work in the private.
jg1 = jg,d1 = ḡ
(
wg2
wg1
β
1− β
)1−β
, (B.7)
jg2 = jg,d2 = ḡ
(
wg1
wg2
1− β
β
)β
. (B.8)
For this regime, the wages in the public sector have to be above those in the private.
wg1 > w̃
g
1 = α
(
1− n− jg,d2
n− jg,d1
)1−α
(B.9)
wg2 > w̃
g
2 = (1− α)
(
n− jg,d1
1− n− jg,d2
)α
(B.10)
The mechanisms here are the same as in the baseline model, except for the absence of
underemployment.
Regime 2: Skilled Public-Sector Wages Too Low
In the case, skilled public wages are below the private wage (when the government hires
its target level of workers): wg1 < w̃g1, skilled workers would move away from the public
sector. However, not all of them would leave, as doing so would push the private sector
wage below the public. Hence, the only equilibrium is that private wages fall until they
are equal to public wages (wp1 = wg1). This pins down jointly educated private employment,
public employment, and unskilled private wages:
jp1 =
(
α
wg1
) 1
1−α
(1− n− jg2), (B.11)
jg1 = n− jp1 , (B.12)
jg2 =
[
ḡ
(jg1)β
] 1
1−β
, (B.13)
wp2 = (1− α)
(
n− jg1
1− n− jg2
)α
, (B.14)
provided that wg2 ≥ w̃g2. To maintain government services it has to open more low-type jobs.
Public employment is supply determined.
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Regime 3: Unskilled public-sector wages too low
Again, we show this case for completeness. It requires that unskilled public wages are too
low and that skilled wages are high enough wg1 ≥ w̃g1 and wg2 < w̃g2. Unskilled workers prefer
private sector so private wages fall until they are equal to public wages (wp2 = wg2). This
pins down jointly educated private employment, public employment, and unskilled private
wages
jp2 =
(
1− α
wg2
) 1
α
(n− jg1), (B.15)
jg2 = 1− n− jp2 (B.16)
jg1 =
[
ḡ
(jg2)1−β
] 1
β
. (B.17)
wp1 = α
(
1− n− jg2
n− jg1
)1−α
, (B.18)
To maintain government services it has to open more high-type jobs. Public employment is
supply determined.
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C One-sector Model with Underemployment
Technology and Preferences
Individuals are endowed with 1 unit of indivisible labor and firms have jobs requiring different
tasks to produce output. There are two types of individuals with high (1) and low (2)
education. The supply of educated individuals in the economy is indicated with n, while
the supply of the low educated workers is indicated with 1− n.
Firms produce with a constant return technology in jobs requiring different skills. There
are skilled and unskilled jobs. In what follows we shall use a Cobb Douglas specification.
y = (j1)α(j2)1−α
where j1(j2) is the number skilled (unskilled) jobs. Jobs can be described through a ladder
type mechanism, so that individuals endowed with higher education are able to perform also
unskilled jobs. They can perform at zero effort costs both type of jobs while individuals
with low education can only perform the unskilled job.
Individual preferences are linear, and the model is static. The wage paid for the skilled
job is indicated with w1 while the wage paid for unskilled job is indicated with w2. Each
individual worker i has an heterogeneous "non-pecuniary value" over these tasks, ε1i and ε2i ,
drawn from a continuous distribution with cumulative density Φ and unbounded lower and
upper support. For simplicity, we also assume that the expected value of E[ε1] = E[ε2] = 0.
These "non-pecuniary" attributes of the job could reflect preferences, but all other elements
such as location of jobs, co-workers, hours, etc. For instance, an educated worker i’s utility
in the skilled job is given by sum of the wage and “non-pecuniary" shock, w1 + νε1i , where ν
captures the weight of the “non-pecuniary" shock in the individual preferences. Our model
accommodates the traditional model in the limit where ν tends to zero.
Sorting by High-Educated Workers and Underemployment
The key decision rests with the educated workers and concerns the type of sector in which
to supply their indivisible unit of labor. An individual i decision is given by
U1i = Max{w1 + νε1i , w2 + νε2i } (C.1)
while type 2 individuals have no choice other than working in the unskilled tasks and their
utility is thus U2i = w2 + νε2i . Educated individuals join the simple tasks only if (w1 + νε1i <
w2 + νε2i )+, or if ηi = w2−w1ν , where ηi = ε
1
i − ε2i . In what follows, we indicate with Φη the
probability distribution over the net preference shock ηi = ε1i −ε2i . Educated individuals join
the simple job if η is low enough so that ηi < w2−w1ν . This simple sorting condition implies
that there is an endogenously determined aggregate number of underemployed defined as
u = Φη(
w2 − w1
ν
) (C.2)
Labor Demand and Market Clearing
Firms maximise profits taking as given the wage for both tasks. Labor demand is given by
w2 = (1− α)
(
j1
j2
)α
, w1 = α
(
j2
j1
)1−α
. (C.3)
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Wages adjust until the demand for jobs requiring a particular task is equal to the supply of
workers for that task. Market clearing equilibrium imply
j1 = n− u , j2 = (1− n) + u. (C.4)
where labor demand j1 and j2 is given by equations (C.3) while underemployment u is
derived from equation (C.2)
Equilibrium
Definition 3 A steady-state equilibrium consists of tasks wages {w1, w2}, jobs in the two
tasks {j1, j2}, and underemployment for skilled workers {u}, such that .
1. Private-sector firms maximizes profits (C.3).
2. Skilled workers sort across labour markets according to (C.2).
3. Markets clear (C.4).
The equilibrium is best summarized in two equations: the sorting condition and a wage
differential condition, in u and w1 − w2:
u = nΦη(
w2 − w1
ν
) (C.5)
w1 − w2 = α
(
(1− n) + u
n− u
)1−α
− (1− α)
(
n− u
(1− n) + u
)α
(C.6)
These two conditions are depicted graphically in Figure C.1. The downward sloping line
is the sorting condition C.2, that crosses the horizontal axis at n2 underemployment. When
the wage differential is zero, workers will split equally between the two types of jobs as none
offers a wage advantage. As the wage differential increases, there are fewer educated willing
to work in unskilled jobs and as this differential increases to infinity underemployment tends
to zero. The upward sloping equation is the wage differential condition, obtained from labor
demand (C.3), and the market clearing conditions (C.4), is increasing in underemployment.
With zero underemployment the intercept represents the wage differential of the typical
model where all the educated workers are performing skilled jobs. As underemployment
increases, this is reflected on an excess supply of workers to unskilled jobs and a shortage
of workers for skilled jobs, thereby increasing the wage differential. As underemployment
approaches the total supply of the skilled n, by the Inada conditions, the wage differential
Figure C.1: Equilibrium Underemployment
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2
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tends to infinity. The equilibrium underemployment is the crossing of the two lines, and is
given by a single equation in underemployment:
u = Φη
(
(1− α)
ν
(
n− u
1− n+ u
)1−α
− α
ν
(1− n+ u
n− u
)α)
(C.7)
The equilibrium exists and is unique.
Comparative Statics
The simple model can be used to illustrate the effects of two interesting comparative static
exercise. Such exercise highlights some features of the public sector that are present in the
main model. Suppose first that the government imposes a proportional income tax (Figure
C.2, left panel). Other things equal, the net-wage differential is lower and the sorting
condition shifts to the right, and equilibrium underemployment rises. Note that despite the
fact that the gross wage differential (w2−w1) rises, the take-home differential actually falls.
Next, suppose that the supply of skilled workers available shrinks. As shown in the right
panel of Figure C.2, both curves shift to the left and equilibrium underemployment falls,
but the wage gap is now larger.
Figure C.2: Equilibrium underemployment with an income tax and skill shortage
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unn
2
Sorting Wage equation
w1 − w2
unn
2
Sorting Wage equation
n′
In a companion paper, we generalize this 1-sector model, considering both under and
overemployment, and different efficiency units of educated workers in unskilled jobs, to
measure the output losses of mismatch (Garibaldi et al. 2019).
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D Baseline model
D.1 Regime 1
Substituting the expressions for wages on underemployment, we get one equation that pins
down u.
u = (n− jg1)
 e
(1−τ)
ν
[(1−α)
(
n−jg1 −u
1−n−jg2 +u
)α
]
+ e
(1−τ)
ν
wg2
e
(1−τ)
ν
wg2 + e
(1−τ)
ν
[α
(
1−n−jg2 +u
n−jg1 −u
)1−α
]
+ e
(1−τ)
ν
[(1−α)
(
n−jg1 −u
1−n−jg2 +u
)α
]
 ≡ T (u) (D.1)
u
uT (u)
n− Jg1
The LHS is the 45 degree line, from 0 to n− Jg1 . The RHS evaluated at zero is positive,
evaluated at n− jg1 is zero and is decreasing in u. We concentrate our analysis on the effects
of public-sector wages for both types of workers, the size of the educated population and the
level of government services. Under Regime 1, we can write the matrix of marginal effects
for the exogenous variables z ∈ {w2g , w1g , ḡ, n} as:
1 − ∂u
∂w1p
− ∂u
∂w2p
− ∂u
∂j1g
0
−∂w
1
p
∂u
1 0 −∂w
1
p
∂jg1
−∂w
1
p
∂jg2
−∂w
2
p
∂u
0 1 −∂w
2
p
∂jg1
−∂w
2
p
∂jg2
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1

×

du
dz
dw1p
dz
dw2p
dz
dj1g
dz
dj2g
dz

=

∂u
∂z
∂wp1
∂z
∂wp2
∂z
∂jg1
∂z
∂jg2
∂z

(D.2)
where:
∂u
∂w1p
= −1−τ
ν
u(1− u
n−jg1
) < 0 ∂u
∂w2p
= 1−τ
ν
up(1− u
n−jg1
) > 0 ∂u
∂j1g
= − u
n−jg1
< 0
∂w1p
∂u
= (1− α)wp1( 1jp1 +
1
jp2
) > 0 ∂w
1
p
∂jg1
= (1−α)w
p
1
jp1
> 0 ∂w
1
p
∂jg2
= − (1−α)w
p
1
jp2
< 0
∂w2p
∂u
= −αwp2( 1jp1 +
1
jp2
) < 0 ∂w
2
p
∂jg1
= −αw
p
2
jp1
< 0 ∂w
2
p
∂jg2
= αw
p
2
jp2
> 0
The right-hand side vector is different depending on which parameter we are doing the
comparative statics on
∂u
∂w2g
= 1−τ
ν
ug(1− u
n−jg1
) > 0 ∂u
∂w1g
= 0 ∂u
∂ḡ
= 0 ∂u
∂n
= (u)
n−jg1
> 0
∂wp1
∂wg2
= 0 ∂w
p
1
∂wg1
= 0 ∂w
p
1
∂ḡ
= 0 ∂w
p
1
∂n
= −(1− α)wp1( 1jp1 +
1
jp2
) < 0
∂wp2
∂wg2
= 0 ∂w
p
2
∂wg1
= 0 ∂w
p
2
∂ḡ
= 0 ∂w
p
2
∂n
= αwp2( 1jp1 +
1
jp2
) > 0
∂jg1
∂wg2
= (1−β)j
g
1
wg2
> 0 ∂j
g
1
∂wg1
= −(1−β)j
g
1
wg1
< 0 ∂j
g
1
∂ḡ
= j
g
1
ḡ
> 0 ∂j
g
1
∂n
= 0
∂jg2
∂wg2
= −βj
g
2
wg2
< 0 ∂j
g
2
∂wg1 =
βjg2
wg1
> 0 ∂j
g
2
∂ḡ
= j
g
2
ḡ
> 0 ∂j
g
2
∂n
= 0
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Solving the matrix system (noticing that ∂w
p
1
∂jg1
× ∂w
p
2
∂jg2
= ∂w
p
1
∂jg2
× ∂w
p
2
∂jg1
, together with (u)
n−jg1
< 1,
− ∂u
∂w1p
= ∂u
∂w2g
+ ∂u
∂w2p
and that ∂j
g
1
∂wg2
< − ∂j
g
2
∂wg2
if wg1 > wg2. With Matlab Symbolic Toolkit (codes
available on request), we show
du
dw2g
≶ 0 du
dw1g
> 0 du
dḡ
≶ 0 du
dn
> 0
dwp1
dwg2
> 0 dw
p
1
dwg1
< 0 dw
p
1
dḡ
≶ 0 dw
p
1
dn
≶ 0
dwp2
dwg2
< 0 dw
p
2
dwg1
> 0 dw
p
2
dḡ
≶ 0 dw
p
2
dn
≶ 0
djg1
dwg2
> 0 dj
g
1
dwg1
< 0 dj
g
1
dḡ
> 0 dj
g
1
dn
= 0
djg2
dwg2
< 0 dj
g
2
dwg1 > 0
djg2
dḡ
> 0 dj
g
2
dn
= 0
D.2 Regime 2
Under Regime 2, the last two rows of the matrix of marginal effects for the exogenous
variables z ∈ {w2g , w1g , ḡ, n} are different:
1 − ∂u
∂w1p
− ∂u
∂w2p
− ∂u
∂j1g
0
−∂w
1
p
∂u
1 0 −∂w
1
p
∂jg1
−∂w
1
p
∂jg2
−∂w
2
p
∂u
0 1 −∂w
2
p
∂jg1
−∂w
2
p
∂jg2
0 − ∂j
g
1
∂w1p
− ∂j
g
1
∂wp2
1 0
0 0 0 −∂j
g
2
∂jg1
1

×

du
dz
dw1p
dz
dw2p
dz
dj1g
dz
dj2g
dz

=

∂u
∂z
∂wp1
∂z
∂wp2
∂z
∂jg1
∂z
∂jg2
∂z

(D.3)
where, in addition
∂jg1
∂wp1
= −1−τ
nν
jp1j
g
1 < 0
∂jg1
∂wp2
= −1−τ
nν
upjg1 < 0
∂jg2
∂jg1
= − β1−β
jg2
jg1
< 0
The last two rows of the right-hand side vectors are now
∂jg1
∂wg2
= −1−τ
nν
ugjg1 < 0
∂jg1
∂wg1
= 1−τ
ν
jg1
n
(1− j
g
1
n
) > 0 ∂j
g
1
∂ḡ
= 0 ∂j
g
1
∂n
= j
g
1
n
> 0
∂jg2
∂wg2
= 0 ∂j
g
2
∂wg1 = 0
∂jg2
∂ḡ
= 1
β
jg2
ḡ
∂jg2
∂n
= 0
Solving the matrix system (noticing that ∂w
p
1
∂jg1
× ∂w
p
2
∂jg2
= ∂w
p
1
∂jg2
× ∂w
p
2
∂jg1
, together with (u)
n−jg1
< 1,
− ∂u
∂w1p
= ∂u
∂w2g
+ ∂u
∂w2p
and that −∂j
g
2
∂jg1
> 1 if wg1 > wg2. With Matlab Symbolic Toolkit (codes
available on request), we show
du
dw2g
≶ 0 du
dw1g
< 0 du
dḡ
≶ 0 du
dn
≶ 0
dwp1
dwg2
> 0 dw
p
1
dwg1
> 0 dw
p
1
dḡ
< 1 dw
p
1
dn
≶ 0
dwp2
dwg2
< 0 dw
p
2
dwg1
< 0 dw
p
2
dḡ
> 0 dw
p
2
dn
≶ 0
djg1
dwg2
≶ 0 dj
g
1
dwg1
> 0 dj
g
1
dḡ
≶ 0 dj
g
1
dn
≶ 0
djg2
dwg2
≶ 0 dj
g
2
dwg1 < 0
djg2
dḡ
≶ 0 dj
g
2
dn
≶ 0
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D.3 Baseline model with alternative sorting mechanism
We set up a variation of the model with an alternative sorting mechanism. We consider
that the underemployment opportunities are proportional to size of sector. The mech-
anism is described in the figure below. Of all the educated workers, a fraction j
g
2
jp2 +j
g
2
has an underemployment opportunity only in the public sector. Those workers choose
between three options Max{wp1 + νεp,1i , w
g
1 + νεg,1i , w
g
2 + νεg,2i }. The remaining fraction
jp2
jp2 +j
g
2
has only an underemployment opportunity in the private sector and chooses between
Max{wp1 + νεp,1i , w
g
1 + νεg,1i , w
p
2 + νεp,2i }.
Opportunity Probability Choice
Educated,
n
jg2
jp2 +j
g
2
Public
jp2
jp2 +j
g
2
Pri
vat
e
{wp1 + νε
p
1, w
g
1 + νε
g
1, w
g
2 + νε
g
2}
{wp1 + νε
p
1, w
g
1 + νε
g
1, w
p
2 + νε
p
2}
The threshold wages w̃g1 and w̃g2 are defined implicitly by
jg,d1 = n
 jp2
jp2 + jg2
e
(1−τ)
ν
w̃g1
e
(1−τ)
ν
w̃g1 + e
(1−τ)
ν
wp1 + e
(1−τ)
ν
wp2
+ j
g
2
jp2 + jg2
e
(1−τ)
ν
w̃g1
e
(1−τ)
ν
w̃g1 + e
(1−τ)
ν
wp1 + e
(1−τ)
ν
wg2
(D.4)
jg,d2 − ug = (1− n)
 e (1−τ)ν w̃g2
e
(1−τ)
ν
w̃g2 + e
(1−τ)
ν
wp2
 (D.5)
And the different shares in the economy given by:
ug = n
 jg2
jp2 + jg2
e
(1−τ)
ν
wg2
e
(1−τ)
ν
w̃g1 + e
(1−τ)
ν
wp1 + e
(1−τ)
ν
wg2
 (D.6)
up = n
 jp2
jp2 + jg2
e
(1−τ)
ν
wp2
e
(1−τ)
ν
w̃g1 + e
(1−τ)
ν
wp1 + e
(1−τ)
ν
wp2
 (D.7)
jp1 = n
 jp2
jp2 + jg2
e
(1−τ)
ν
wp1
e
(1−τ)
ν
w̃g1 + e
(1−τ)
ν
wp1 + e
(1−τ)
ν
wp2
+ j
g
2
jp2 + jg2
e
(1−τ)
ν
wp1
e
(1−τ)
ν
w̃g1 + e
(1−τ)
ν
wp1 + e
(1−τ)
ν
wg2
(D.8)
The mechanism is similar to the baseline model but with more complicated solution. The
advantage of this extension is that it gives a ratio public employment shares of 1, in the
symmetric case, which we think is more realistic. Hence, we use this variation of the model
in the quantitative section.
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E Extensions
E.1 Endogenous Public-Sector Wages
Our theory for the endogenous determination of public-sector wage is based on a union
constraint. We think the higher unionization rates in the public sector could be one of the
causes of significant public-private wage differentials and the compression across education
levels. According to the CPS, for our sample period, the unionisation rate is 37 percent in
the public sector compared to 8 percent in the private. However, these could be driven by
other political economy factors or simply aversion to inequality. It might also be partly the
consequence of history dependence and a more sluggish adjustment to technological changes
that increased wage inequality in the private sector, as suggested by Borjas (2003). Here we
present one possible theory.
We can provide microeconomic foundations for the public employment and wage policies
that are taken as exogenous in the baseline model. Consider a government that wants to
minimize cost subject to maintaining the production of government services ḡ. Additionally,
it faces a constrain imposed by unions, that arise from political pressure. The preferences
of a union represented by θ ln(a1) + (1 − θ) ln(a2). Here θ represents the weight of skilled
workers in the union’s preferences and a1 and a2 are the extra payment to public-sector
workers on top of the threshold wage for the unconstrained public sector (wg1 = w̃g1 + a1 and
wg2 = w̃g2 + a2). The union knows what this minimum required wage is and tries to push the
wages above. For convenience, we assume the function expressing the utility of the extra
payment to type i workers is log(ai). The government’s problem can be written as:
min
jg1 ,j
g
2
wg1j
g
1 + wg2jg1
s.t.
ḡ = (jg1)β(jg2)1−β.
Ū = θ ln(a1) + (1− θ) ln(a2).
wg1 = w̃g1 + a1.
wg2 = w̃g2 + a2.
Where Ū is the required utility of unions. The first order conditions of this problem are:
jg,d1 = ḡ
(
wg2
wg1
β
1− β
)1−β
, (E.1)
jg,d2 = ḡ
(
wg1
wg2
1− β
β
)β
. (E.2)
a1 =
Ωθ
jg,d1
(E.3)
a2 =
Ω(1− θ)
jg,d2
(E.4)
The first two conditions pin down the employment level of the government and are equal
to the baseline case. The last two conditions pin down government wages. The additional
payment to each type of workers depends on the strength of the union constraint (measured
by Ω) and the relative preference of the union over skilled and unskilled workers. Whether
it raises more the skilled or unskilled wages, depends on the relative weight on the union
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preference. This could generate different premia (including negative premia) for different
types of workers.
If Ū = 0, a1 = a2 = 0 and the wge = w̃ge , the government offers the minimum wage neces-
sary to hire the workers it needs. This would be the outcome of a benevolent government.
This is one model of government behaviour, but there could certainly be others. Under this
conditions, the economy would be always under Regime 1. To push the government into
Regime 2, we would need to add other elements such as budgetary pressures. We think
however, when studying the effects of public wages, it is a clearer exercise to take them as
exogenous.
E.2 Heterogeneous Ability of Educated Workers
We think that heterogeneity of ability of educated workers is an important dimension to
understand both underemployment and the selection into the public sector, and how it is
affected by the wage compression. Consider a variation of the model where high-educated
workers are heterogeneous in their effective units of labour. The setting is described in the
figure below. A fraction χ of educated workers have 1+η efficiency units in skilled jobs, while
the remaining only have 1− η. Wages in the private sector reflect perfectly their efficiency
units, with the high-ability workers earning (1 + η)wp1 and the low-ability workers earning
(1 − η)wp1. Given that underemployment is a negative function of the wage differential
between skilled and unskilled jobs, it is clear that underemployment is concentrated on the
low-ability workers.
Ability Efficiency units Wages
High-
Educated,
n
1− η
Low (1−
χ)
1 + η
Hig
h (
χ)
[1−η]wp2 [1−ηδ]wg2
[1+η]wp1 [1+ηδ]wg1
In the public sector, the payment structure might not reflect entirely the efficiency units
of the worker. We assume that the wages of high-ability educated workers is (1 + ηδ)wg1
and for low-ability workers (1 − ηδ)wg1. The parameter δ reflects the within-group wage
compression. If δ < 1, there is lower wage dispersion in the public sector for educated
workers. This fact that has been widely documented.19 At the limit, where δ = 0, the
government offers one wage independent of the efficiency units.
19This has been found running quantile regressions and finding that for the bottom of the earnings
distribution the public-sector wage premium is large at the bottom very low or negative. See for instance
Christofides and Michael (2013).
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This heterogeneity requires that we distinguish the number of workers in terms of head-
count and in efficiency units. Furthermore, we assume that the government always prefers
the high-ability workers and restrain the analysis to the case χ is small enough so that the
government cannot exhaust the high skilled jobs with high-ability educated workers. We
can defined the market clearing in headcount:
nχ = lg1,h + l
p
1,h + uh (E.5)
n(1− χ) = lg1,` + l
p
1,` + u` (E.6)
1− n = jg2 + jp2 − uh − u`. (E.7)
where lx1,h and lx1,` denote the number of high- and low-ability working in sector x. In terms
of efficiency units the market clearing is given by
jg1 = (1 + η)lg1,h + (1− η)l
g
1,` (E.8)
jp1 = (1 + η)lp1,h + (1− η)l
p
1,` (E.9)
Regarding the sorting, we assume that the government skilled jobs is always high enough
such that high ability workers that want a public-sector job always enter. Hence, for the high
ability, the sorting between underemployment, public-sector employment and private-sector
employment (remainder) is given by
uh = nχ
 e (1−τ)ν wp2 + e (1−τ)ν wg2
e
(1−τ)
ν
wg2 + e
(1−τ)
ν
(1+ηδ)wg1 + e
(1−τ)
ν
(1+η)wp1 + e
(1−τ)
ν
wp2
 (E.10)
lg1,h = nχ
 e (1−τ)ν (1+ηδ)wg1
e
(1−τ)
ν
wg2 + e
(1−τ)
ν
(1+ηδ)wg1 + e
(1−τ)
ν
(1+η)wp1 + e
(1−τ)
ν
wp2
 (E.11)
The low-ability workers take the remaining public-sector jobs. We focus on regime 1
(public-sector wages are high enough) such that for them, jobs are rationed. Hence, the
number of low-ability workers in the public sector and underemployed are given by:
lg2,` =
jg1 − (1 + η)lg1,h
(1− η) (E.12)
u` =
[
n(1− χ)− lg2,`
]  e (1−τ)ν wp2 + e (1−τ)ν wg2
e
(1−τ)
ν
wg2 + e
(1−τ)
ν
(1−η)wp1 + e
(1−τ)
ν
wp2
 (E.13)
In this version of the model, skilled workers with low efficiency units have lower wages
in skilled jobs, and hence are more likely to be underemployed. Our model also helps to
understand the implications of the wage compression within education groups. If δ is below
1, the government does not fully reward the efficiency units of high-ability educated workers
and rewards too much low-ability workers. As such, fewer high-ability skilled workers work
for the government, that is more likely to be constrained by the supply of high-ability
workers. Hence, it has to employ more of the low-ability skilled workers whose efficiency
units are relatively more expensive, which in turn amplifies the education bias.
E.3 Endogenous income tax
One element that we did not develop in the baseline model was the financing side of the
government. τ was taken as a parameter in the baseline model. The justification would
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be that such policies would be financed with government debt or cuts in other spending
categories. However, we can easily endogeneize tax rate in the model by introducing an
additional budget constraint. τ adjusts in order to balance the government budget. This
implies adding a fourth equation to the model and a fourth endogenous variable.
The model can now be written in four equations in u, wp1, wp2 and τ
u = (n− jg1)
 e (1−τ)ν wp2 + e (1−τ)ν wg2
e
(1−τ)
ν
wg2 + e
(1−τ)
ν
wp1 + e
(1−τ)
ν
wp2
 (E.14)
wp1 = α
(
1− n− jg2 + u
n− jg1 − u
)1−α
, (E.15)
wp2 = (1− α)
(
n− jg1 − u
1− n− jg2 + u
)α
, (E.16)
τ = w
g
1j
g
1 + wg2jg2
(jp1)α(jp2)1−α + wg1jg1 + wg2jg2
(E.17)
The solution to the system of total derivatives is:

1 − ∂u
∂w1p
− ∂u
∂w2p
− ∂u
∂j1g
0 −∂u
∂τ
−∂w
1
p
∂u
1 0 −∂w
1
p
∂jg1
−∂w
1
p
∂jg2
0
−∂w
2
p
∂u
0 1 −∂w
2
p
∂jg1
−∂w
2
p
∂jg2
0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
−∂τ
∂u
0 0 − ∂τ
∂∂j1g
− ∂τ
∂∂j2g
1

×

du
dz
dw1p
dz
dw2p
dz
dj1g
dz
dj2g
dz

=

∂u
∂z
∂wp1
∂z
∂wp2
∂z
∂jg1
∂z
∂jg2
∂z
∂τ
∂z

(E.18)
∂u
∂τ
= j
p
1
ν
(wp1 un−jg1 − w
p
2u
p − wg2ug > 0 ∂τ∂u =
(wp1−w
p2)τ
(jp1 )α(j
p
2 )1−α+w
g
1j
g
1 +w
g
2j
g
2
> 0 ∂τ
∂j1g
= w
g
1(1−τ)
(jp1 )α(j
p
2 )1−α+w
g
1j
g
1 +w
g
2j
g
2
> 0
∂τ
∂j2g
= w
g
2(1−τ)
(jp1 )α(j
p
2 )1−α+w
g
1j
g
1 +w
g
2j
g
2
> 0 ∂τ
∂wg2
= j
g
2 (1−τ)
(jp1 )α(j
p
2 )1−α+w
g
1j
g
1 +w
g
2j
g
2
> 0 ∂τ
∂wg1
jg1 (1−τ)
(jp1 )α(j
p
2 )1−α+w
g
1j
g
1 +w
g
2j
g
2
> 0
The tax rate has a same effect as a change in ν, the weight of the non-pecuniary el-
ement of preferences. Higher taxes lowers the net income differential between skilled and
unskilled jobs, so it raises underemployment. See, for instance, Figure C.2 in Appendix
C for the effects of an increase tax rate in the a one-sector model. An increase of skilled
or unskilled wages, by raising government spending, have an additional positive effect on
underemployment by raising the income tax.
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E.4 Dual government problem
In the baseline model, the government minimizes the cost of producing a certain level of
government services. There exists a dual government problem, where it maximizes services
subject to an exogenous wage bill. Consider a government that, because of budgetary
constraints, has a limited amount of spending ω̄, exogenous. Its problem is given by:
max
jg1 ,j
g
2
(jg1)β(jg2)1−β
s.t.
wg1j
g
1 + wg2jg1 = ω̄.
The first-order conditions pinning employment are given by:
jg,d1 = ω̄
(
β
wg1
)
, (E.19)
jg,d2 = ω̄
(
1− β
wg2
)
, (E.20)
The two conditions pin down the employment level of the government. Now, the number of
workers of a given type only depends on their wage. Given technology and a certain wage,
the government spends a constant fraction β of its budget on skilled workers and 1− β on
unskilled workers. Differently from the baseline, jg1 is increasing in β and decreasing in wg1
and jg2 is decreasing in wg2 and β. The derivatives of employment are given by:
∂jg1
∂wg2
= 0 ∂j
g
1
∂wg1
= −j
g
1
wg1
< 0
∂jg2
∂wg2
= − j
g
2
wg2
< 0 ∂j
g
2
∂wg1 = 0
The solution to this problem is simpler as increases in the unskilled wage lower propor-
tionally the number of unskilled jobs, but do not affect the number of skilled jobs. The
expressions for the elasticities of private wages with respect to public wages also simplify,
with no cross term. For instance, the elasticities with respect to unskilled public wage are
given by:
dwp1
dwg2
wg2
wp1
= (1− α)j
g
2
jp2
+ du
dwg2
[
(1− α)
jp2
+ (1− α)
jp1
]
wg2, (E.21)
dwp2
dwg2
wg2
wp2
= −αj
g
2
jp2
− du
dwg2
[
α
jp2
+ α
jp1
]
wg2. (E.22)
While the decomposition of the elasticity of private wages is different, the intuition is similar.
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F Additional quantitative results
Calibration for European countries and Baseline Model
Table F.1: Calibration, European Countries
Parameter UK France Spain Variable UK France Spain
Targeted
α 0.224 0.302 0.294 w
p
1
wp2
1.401 1.474 1.434
β 0.530 0.449 0.624 jg1 + ug 0.133 0.091 0.101
ḡ 0.123 0.106 0.082 jg2 − ug 0.115 0.122 0.060
n 0.354 0.323 0.369 n 0.354 0.323 0.369
wg1 0.808 0.700 0.744
wg1
wp1
1.059 0.985 1.060
wg2 0.597 0.504 0.580
wg2
wp2
1.096 1.045 1.179
ν
1−τ 1.645 0.224 0.271
u
jg2 +j
p
2
0.149 0.088 0.124
Not Targeted
ug
jg2
0.189 0.055 0.199
up
jp2
0.137 0.097 0.114
Note: Underemployment rate statistics are calculated from PIACC and are shown in Figure 6. The
public employment of college and no-college is shown in Figure 2 and is calculated from each countries
Labour Force Survey, 2003 to 2018. Public-sector wage premia are estimated using the Structure
of Earnings Survey (pooled 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014 data) shown in Figure A.4. The college
premium in the private sector is estimated by regressing the log of hourly wages of private workers
on a college dummy, controlling for age, gender, region, year and a part-time dummy.
Table F.2: Calibration, Baseline Model
Parameter Value Variable Description Model Data
Targeted
α 0.483 w
p
1
wp2
College premium (private sector) 1.580 1.580
β 0.503 jg1 + ug Public employment of college 0.097 0.097
ḡ 0.078 jg2 − ug Public employment of no-college 0.062 0.062
n 0.432 n Percentage of college workers 0.432 0.432
wg1 0.641
wg1
wp1
Public-sector wage premium (college) 1.010 1.010
wg2 0.431
wg2
wp2
Public-sector wage premium (college) 1.077 1.077
ν
1−τ 0.089
u
jg2 +j
p
2
Underemployment rate (economy) 0.089 0.089
Not Targeted
ug
jg2
Underemployment rate (public) 0.340 0.102
up
jp2
Underemployment rate (private) 0.043 0.087
Note: Underemployment rate statistics are calculated from PIACC and are shown in Figure 6. The
remaining data is calculated from the CPS, 1996 to 2018. The public employment of college and
no-college is shown in Figure 2. Public-sector wage premium is shown in the first two columns of
Table 2. The college premium in the private sector is estimated by regressing the log of hourly wages
of private workers on a college dummy, controlling for age, gender, region, year and a part-time
dummy.
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Quantitative results for European countries
Table F.3: Decomposition of Public-Sector Education Bias, European Countries
Variable Data Baseline Equating Equating wages
wages and technology
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: United Kingdom
Public employment shares
Skilled 0.376 0.376 0.374 0.210
Unskilled 0.177 0.177 0.179 0.208
Ratio 2.118 2.118 2.091 1.012
Education intensity
Public 0.537 0.537 0.534 0.357
Private 0.294 0.294 0.295 0.354
Ratio 1.828 1.828 1.811 1.009
Underemployment rate
Total 0.149 0.149 0.149 0.190
Public* 0.189 0.152 0.149 0.191
Private* 0.137 0.149 0.149 0.190
Panel B: France
Public employment shares
Skilled 0.283 0.283 0.275 0.197
Unskilled 0.180 0.180 0.185 0.197
Ratio 1.575 1.575 1.491 1.000
Education intensity
Public 0.429 0.429 0.416 0.323
Private 0.295 0.295 0.298 0.323
Ratio 1.458 1.458 1.395 1.000
Underemployment rate
Total 0.088 0.089 0.090 0.110
Public* 0.055 0.094 0.090 0.110
Private* 0.097 0.087 0.090 0.110
Panel C: Spain
Public employment shares
Skilled 0.275 0.274 0.262 0.151
Unskilled 0.094 0.094 0.102 0.151
Ratio 2.913 2.925 2.565 1.001
Education intensity
Public 0.630 0.631 0.600 0.369
Private 0.319 0.319 0.325 0.369
Ratio 1.977 1.978 1.848 1.001
Underemployment rate
Total 0.124 0.124 0.125 0.164
Public* 0.199 0.154 0.126 0.164
Private* 0.114 0.121 0.125 0.164
Column (2) displays the statistics simulated from the model. Column (3) displays the statistics
from a simulation where public-sector wages are equal to private-sector wages for the two types of
jobs. Column (4) displays the statistics from a simulation where public-sector wages are equal to
private-sector wages for the two types of jobs and β = α. * statistics not calibrated.
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Table F.4: Elasticities of Private-Sector Wages, European Countries
Variable Elasticity Decomposition
Shortage of skilled Excess unskilled Underemployment
Panel A: United Kingdom
Elasticity of private wages w.r.t. unskilled public wages
dwp1
dwg2
wg2
wp1
0.206 0.319 0.089 -0.202
dwp2
dwg2
wg2
wp2
-0.059 -0.092 -0.026 0.058
Elasticity of private wages w.r.t. skilled public wages
dwp1
dwg1
wg1
wp1
-0.182 -0.319 -0.089 0.224
dwp2
dwg1
wg1
wp2
0.053 0.092 0.026 -0.065
Elasticity of private wages w.r.t. public wages
dwp1
dwg
wg
wp1
0.023 0.000 0.000 0.022
dwp2
dwg
wg
wp2
-0.007 0.000 0.000 -0.006
Panel B: France
Elasticity of private wages w.r.t. unskilled public wages
dwp1
dwg2
wg2
wp1
0.144 0.169 0.069 -0.094
dwp2
dwg2
wg2
wp2
-0.062 -0.073 -0.030 0.041
Elasticity of private wages w.r.t. skilled public wages
dwp1
dwg1
wg1
wp1
-0.091 -0.169 -0.069 0.147
dwp2
dwg1
wg1
wp2
0.039 0.073 0.030 -0.064
Elasticity of private wages w.r.t. public wages
dwp1
dwg
wg
wp1
0.053 0.000 0.000 0.053
dwp2
dwg
wg
wp2
-0.023 0.000 0.000 -0.023
Panel C: Spain
Elasticity of private wages w.r.t. unskilled public wages
dwp1
dwg2
wg2
wp1
0.094 0.127 0.047 -0.079
dwp2
dwg2
wg2
wp2
-0.039 -0.053 -0.020 0.033
Elasticity of private wages w.r.t. skilled public wages
dwp1
dwg1
wg1
wp1
-0.059 -0.127 -0.047 0.114
dwp2
dwg1
wg1
wp2
0.025 0.053 0.020 -0.048
Elasticity of private wages w.r.t. public wages
dwp1
dwg
wg
wp1
0.036 0.000 0.000 0.035
dwp2
dwg
wg
wp2
-0.015 0.000 0.000 -0.015
Note: the first column is calculated numerically, the decomposition is based on equations 24 and 25.
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Quantitative results baseline model
Table F.5: Decomposition of Public-Sector Education Bias, Baseline Model
Variable Data Baseline Equating Equating wages
wages and technology
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public employment shares
Skilled 0.224 0.224 0.207 0.202
Unskilled 0.109 0.110 0.124 0.127
Ratio 2.054 2.034 1.671 1.593
Education intensity
Public 0.610 0.607 0.560 0.548
Private 0.399 0.399 0.408 0.410
Ratio 1.530 1.523 1.373 1.336
Underemployment rate
Total 0.089 0.088 0.085 0.087
Public* 0.102 0.340 0.272 0.273
Private* 0.087 0.043 0.050 0.052
Column (2) displays the statistics simulated from the model. Column (3) displays the statistics
from a simulation where public-sector wages are equal to private-sector wages for the two types of
jobs. Column (4) displays the statistics from a simulation where public-sector wages are equal to
private-sector wages for the two types of jobs and β = α. * statistics not calibrated.
Table F.6: Elasticities of Private-Sector Wages, Baseline Model
Variable Elasticity Decomposition
Shortage of skilled Excess unskilled Underemployment
Elasticity of private wages w.r.t. unskilled public wages
dwp1
dwg2
wg2
wp1
0.211 0.053 0.047 0.111
dwp2
dwg2
wg2
wp2
-0.196 -0.050 -0.043 -0.104
Elasticity of private wages w.r.t. skilled public wages
dwp1
dwg1
wg1
wp1
-0.041 -0.053 -0.047 0.058
dwp2
dwg1
wg1
wp2
0.039 0.050 0.043 -0.054
Elasticity of private wages w.r.t. public wages
dwp1
dwg
wg
wp1
0.169 0.000 0.000 0.169
dwp2
dwg
wg
wp2
-0.158 0.000 0.000 -0.158
Note: the first column is calculated numerically, the decomposition is based on equations 24 and 25.
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G Quantitative Results, More Restricted Definition of
Educated
In our main quantitative results, the US economy was in Regime 1 and far from Regime 2.
However, one should not diminish the importance of modeling the different regimes when
studying public employment. To highlight its importance, we do an alternative calibration
where the educated workers are defined to have an MSc., Professional or PhD degree. These
make up close to 10 percent of the employed population. Out of these, more than one third
work in the public sector. These workers have a negative public-sector wage premium of
about 4 percent. In this particular calibration, we set the same value for ν1−τ . Given the
education premium for these workers, the model predicts very little underemployment.
This economy is in Regime 2. This means that the government wage policy actually
reduces the number of educated workers, so technology explains more than 100 percent of
the education bias. The private-sector wage elasticity with respect to public skilled wages,
have the opposite sign of the baseline case in Regime 1.
Table G.1: Calibration, Alternative Definition of Educated
Parameter Value Variable Description Model Data
Targeted
α 0.113 w
p
1
wp2
College premium (private sector) 1.700 1.697
β 0.379 jg1 + ug Public employment of PhD-MSc.-Professional 0.033 0.032
ḡ 0.075 jg2 − ug Public employment of non PhD-MSc.-Professional 0.125 0.125
n 0.091 n Percentage of PhD-MSc.-Professional workers 0.091 0.092
wg1 1.049
wg1
wp1
Public-sector wage premium (high-educated) 0.933 0.961
wg2 0.700
wg2
wp2
Public-sector wage premium (low-educated) 1.058 1.065
ν
1−τ 0.142 (kept from main calibration)
Not Targeted
u
jg2 +j
p
2
Underemployment rate (economy) 0.0023 -
ug
jg2
Underemployment rate (public) 0.0029 -
up
jp2
Underemployment rate (private) 0.0022 -
Note: ν1−τ is not recalibrated. The remaining parameters are calibrated to match data calculated from
the CPS, 1996 to 2018. The high educated are now defined to have an MSc.-PhD. and low-educated
are those with Bachelors or below. The public-sector wage premium and the college premium in the
private sector are re-estimated.
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Table G.2: Decomposition of Public Education Bias, Alternative Definition of Educated
Variable Data Baseline Equating Equating wages
wages and technology
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public employment shares
Skilled 0.346 0.346 0.360 0.108
Unskilled 0.140 0.140 0.136 0.107
Ratio 2.478 2.478 2.651 1.008
Education intensity
Public 0.200 0.200 0.211 0.092
Private 0.071 0.071 0.069 0.091
Ratio 2.809 2.809 3.037 1.008
Underemployment rate
Total 0.0023 0.002 0.010
Public 0.0029 0.002 0.010
Private 0.0022 0.002 0.010
Column (2) displays the statistics simulated from the model. Column (3) displays the statistics
from a simulation where public-sector wages are equal to private-sector wages for the two types of
jobs. Column (4) displays the statistics from a simulation where public-sector wages are equal to
private-sector wages for the two types of jobs and β = α. * statistics not calibrated.
Table G.3: Elasticities of Private Wages, Alternative Definition of Educated
Variable Elasticity
Baseline model Alternative definition of educated
Elasticity of private wages w.r.t. unskilled public wages
dwp1
dwg2
wg2
wp1
0.074 0.005
dwp2
dwg2
wg2
wp2
-0.061 -0.001
Elasticity of private wages w.r.t. skilled public wages
dwp1
dwg1
wg1
wp1
-0.046 0.657
dwp2
dwg1
wg1
wp2
0.038 -0.084
Elasticity of private wages w.r.t. public wages
dwp1
dwg
wg
wp1
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Note: calculated numerically, the decomposition is based on equations 24 and 25.
Figure G.1: Regimes as a Function of the Public Wage Schedule, Alternative Definition of
Educated
0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1 1.05
Unskilled public wages (relative to baseline)
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
1.1
1.15
1.2
1.25
1.3
S
ki
lle
d 
pu
bl
ic
-s
ec
to
r 
w
ag
es
 (
re
la
tiv
e 
to
 b
as
el
in
e)
63
Figure G.2: Effects of Public Skilled Wages, Alternative Definition of Educated
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Figure G.3: Effects of Public Unskilled Wages, Alternative Definition of Educated
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